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HIGH SCHOOL COACHES CALL A FOUL: IMPORTANT
CONSIDERATIONS FOR HIGH SCHOOL COACHES
CONSIDERING A DEFAMATION CLAIM
I. INTRODUCTION: THE

GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY OF HIGH

SCHOOL ATHLETICS

High school athletics are a prominent aspect of many communities.1 For young athletes, athletics allow them to improve athletic
abilities and learn the importance of teamwork, sportsmanship, and
healthy competitiveness.2 For community members, high school
athletics are a source of pride when it comes to the athletic abilities
of students and the ability of coaches to lead a winning team.3
High school basketball coaches are faced with a wide range of challenges on and off the court, but for many coaches, the most difficult coaching challenge is handling comments and complaints
from the parents of team members.4 Coaches seeking a legal rem1. See generally Understanding the Benefits of High School Sports, CARIS SPORTS
FOUND., https://carissportsfoundation.org/understanding-the-benefits-of-highschool-sports/ [https://perma.cc/C9GV-QXE8] (last visited Mar. 10, 2022) (noting high school sports benefit communities by bringing them together to support
common cause in addition to providing developmental benefits to children).
2. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Utah 2007) (observing high school athletics, which largely depends on adequacy of coaches, have
profound impact on athletes’ futures); Bob Gardner, High School Activities Bring
Communities Together, NAT. FED’N STATE HIGH SCH. ASS’N (Aug. 28, 2017), https://
www.nfhs.org/articles/high-school-activities-bring-communities-together/ [https:/
/perma.cc/BB6A-3TZE] (stating high school athletes have higher grade averages,
better attendance, strong work ethics due to demands of being on sports teams).
3. See, e.g., McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 825 (Minn. 2019) (stating
public has interest in wins, losses of local high school sports teams); O’Connor, 165
P.3d at 1219 (declaring parents of high school athletes “experience directly the
joys, sorrows, and injustices of athletic competition”). In addition to providing a
source of pride, high school athletics also give community members a sense of
unity by bringing people together to support a common cause. See Gardner, supra
note 2 (indicating high school athletics provide communities with opportunity to
celebrate commonality of supporting hard work of young athletes).
4. See Br. for Minn. State High Sch. Coaches Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 2, McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 2019) (No. A18-0167)
[hereinafter Br. for MSHSCA] (describing slander against high school coaches as
“rampant problem facing high school coaches”); see also Jordan Harrell, High School
Coach Resigns Due to Parent Politics. . . And It’s Time to Say Something Out Loud, FRIDAY
NIGHT WIVES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://fridaynightwives.com/high-school-coach-resigns-due-to-parent-politics-and-its-time-to-say-something-out-loud/ [https://
perma.cc/LU4A-JPYU] (discussing high school coach’s resignation due to parent
political pressures: “we’ve all watched our coaches deal with it. The emails, the
complaints . . . the demands and threats from parents who think they know better
than the coach whose job is literally on the line with every win and every loss . . . .

(421)

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

1

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7

422

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 421

edy to combat any reputational harm they have suffered from false
comments and attacks made by parents, turn to the tort of defamation for relief.5
However, the law of defamation is restricted by the Constitutional protection of free speech and debate; thus, not all defamation plaintiffs will be treated the same.6 Certain plaintiffs must
satisfy an extremely high burden, showing the defamatory remarks
were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth.7
Although defamation is restricted by the Constitution, individuals
are still entitled to legal redress for reputational harm suffered.8
High school coaches are often subject to campaigns of serious allegations that may destroy their coaching careers and seriously tarnish their reputation outside of the context of coaching, but
nothing in Supreme Court precedent supports restricting a high
school coach’s ability to seek redress through defamation law.9 In
2019, the Minnesota Supreme Court made it clear that no legal or
policy principle supported imposing a heightened burden on high
school coaches harmed by defamatory remarks, and its decision
should guide future courts that are tasked with the same inquiry.10
This Comment argues that the Minnesota decision, McGuire v.
Bowlin,11 illustrates why applying the heightened burden to high
school coaches goes against legal precedent and public policy interSo parents, I write this to implore you: we’re losing good ones. Good coaches and
good teachers are leaving the profession because it’s so hard to do it with
integrity.”).
5. See Br. for MSHSCA, supra note 4, at 10 (arguing high school coaches face
various attacks by parents; thus, coaches should have ability to pursue damages
through defamation law).
6. See O’Connor, 165 P.3d at 1217 (noting defamation does not treat plaintiffs
equally).
7. See id. (“Those who by choice or mishap acquire the status of a public official or public figure surrender a sizeable measure of their right to recover damages
from those who defame them. Statements directed against public officials or public figures require proof that the speaker acted with actual malice . . .”); see also
Jeffrey Omar Usman, Article, Defamation and the Government Employee: Redefining
Who Constitutes a Public Official, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 247, 258–59 (2015) (noting
burden of proof in defamation depends on categorization of plaintiff as private or
public individual).
8. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85–86 (1966) (acknowledging heightened burden for Constitutional purposes does not ignore societal interest in seeking legal remedy for reputational harm suffered).
9. See McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 823–24 (Minn. 2019) (applying
Supreme Court jurisprudence to conclude heightened burden not applicable to
high school coach).
10. See id. at 827 (concluding high school coach is not public official worthy
of heightened burden). For further discussion of why this decision should guide
other courts, see infra notes 277–292 and accompanying text.
11. 932 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 2019).
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ests surrounding high school sports.12 Part II explores the origins
of defamation, the Supreme Court’s creation and expansion of a
heightened burden for certain defamation plaintiffs, and the McGuire decision.13 Part III provides a comprehensive look at courts
outside of Minnesota that have questioned the applicability of the
heightened burden when the defamation plaintiff is a high school
coach.14 In discussing courts outside of Minnesota, Part III also
analyzes why the heightened burden should not be applied to high
school coaches and explains how the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
reasoning is the preferable method of reasoning when the defamation plaintiff is a high school coach.15 Part IV provides a brief summary of how Supreme Court precedent, the McGuire decision, and
the interests of coaches and parents impact defamation claims.16
II. THE SUPREME COURT, DEFAMATION, AND HIGH SCHOOL
COACHES: PUBLIC OFFICIAL, PUBLIC FIGURE, OR PRIVATE
INDIVIDUAL? THE DETERMINATION MATTERS
Defamation law is rooted in the longstanding view that an individual has the right to protect their reputation and livelihood
within their respective community.17 However, a plaintiff’s avenue
to relief in a defamation action has changed greatly in the United
12. For further discussion of why applying a heightened burden to coach defamation claims would have negative impacts on high school sports and would function in contrast with United States Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence, see
infra notes 252–299 and accompanying text.
13. For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s decisions and the creation
of the heightened burden, see infra notes 28–66 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and reasoning behind the Minnesota Supreme Court’s McGuire decision, see infra notes 72–139 and accompanying
text.
14. For further discussion of state courts that have decided whether the
heightened burden is applicable to high school coaches filing defamation claims,
see infra notes 151–227 and accompanying text.
15. For further discussion of why McGuire correctly refused to apply the
heightened burden to a high school coach, see infra notes 277–292 and accompanying text.
16. For discussion of Supreme Court precedent, the McGuire decision, and
how the interests of coaches and parents impact defamation claims, see infra notes
300–304 and accompanying text.
17. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (stating interest
in right to protect one’s name “reflects no more than our basic concept of the
essential dignity and worth of every human being — a concept at the root of any
decent system of ordered liberty” (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92
(1966) (Stewart, J., concurring))); see also Jonathan Deem, Note, Freedom of the Press
Box: Classifying High School Athletes Under the Gertz Public Figure Doctrine, 108 W. VA. L.
REV. 799, 801–02 (2006) (explaining origins of defamation law, arguing right to
protect reputation has been fundamental to society for many years but modern
defamation law differs from tradition understanding of defamation law).
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States, as compared to its traditional English common law origins.18
Modern changes to defamation law have a massive impact on which
plaintiffs will prevail on a defamation claim, and it is no secret that
United States defamation law does not treat all plaintiffs equally.19
Defamation is governed by state legislation; thus, defamation varies
slightly among different states, but regardless of state legislation,
defamation law is generally limited by First Amendment protections.20 In general, to satisfy the elements of defamation a plaintiff
must prove: (1) the defendant made a false and defamatory statement regarding the plaintiff; (2) the statement was unprivileged to
a third party; (3) the statement harms or has the tendency to harm
the plaintiff’s reputation; and (4) the defendant was at fault.21
18. See Deem, supra note 17, at 802 (stating modern defamation law
originated from English law but modern United States defamation law is unique);
see also Vincent R. Johnson, Comparative Defamation Law: England and the United
States, 24 U. MIA. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 4–6, 18–22 (2016) (analyzing shared
legal principles of England with United States, stating “during the past half century, the paths of England and the United States have significantly diverged in the
field of defamation”); see also Gerald Smith, Comment, Of Malice and Men: The Law
of Defamation, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 39, 40 (1992) (discussing defamation law in
United States, stating balance between First Amendment rights versus reputational
rights has resulted in “plaintiff status approach [requiring] a determination of differing degrees of defendant culpability, depending on whether the plaintiff is a
public official, public figure, or private individual”).
19. See O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1217 (Utah 2007) (applying
United States Supreme Court precedent to defamation action, stating “a central
maxim of these cases is that in the realm of defamation law all persons are not
treated equally”); see also Johnson, supra note 18, at 18, 32–33 (arguing United
States defamation law is pro-defendant because burden placed on defamation
plaintiffs in America is heavier than plaintiffs’ burden in England because of “demanding way in which the American ‘actual malice’ standard has been interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court”); Heather Maly, Note, Publish at Your Own
Risk or Don’t Publish at All: Forum Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First
Amendment Un-Guaranteed, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 883, 894–96 (2006) (stating American
defamation law requires public official, public figure plaintiffs to prove actual malice, which is “difficult barrier for plaintiffs to overcome in bringing defamation
actions” but actual malice barrier is “not as readily applicable” to plaintiffs who are
private individuals).
20. See 50 AM. JUR. 2D LIBEL AND SLANDER § 15 (2021) (“[C]auses of action for
defamation have their basis in state common law, they are subject to the principles
of freedom of speech arising under the federal and state constitutions.”); see also
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349 (attempting to balance state defamation laws with requirements of First Amendment); Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, Symposium, Defamation of
Sports Officials, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 781, 785–88 (1999) (stating defamation was defined by individual state law until 1964 when Supreme Court announced Constitutional restrictions to defamation laws); Stephen G. Strauss, Defamation and the
Collegiate Athlete: The Case of Failed Reporting and an NFL Drug Test, 3 SPORTS LAW. J.
51, 57 (1996) (“States can set the standard private individuals must meet to recover
compensatory damages, so long as they require fault.”).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DEFAMATION § 558 (Am. L. Inst.
1977) (providing elements necessary to create liability for defamation); see also McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 823 (Minn. 2019) (stating elements of defama-
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The standard for determining whether a defendant was at fault
ranges from negligence to actual malice, depending on whether
the plaintiff is considered a private individual, public official, or a
public figure.22 The distinction between private and public status
was first announced by the United States Supreme Court in N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan23 and was later extended by the Court in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc.24 The Court’s holding in New York Times requires defamation plaintiffs who are determined to be public officials to prove the defendant acted with “actual malice,” commonly
known as the “New York Times” rule.”25 For some defamation
plaintiffs, such as the plaintiff in McGuire, the New York Times rule
and its extension is the determining factor in whether a defamation
claim will prevail to provide relief from the reputational damage
the plaintiffs have suffered.26 Consequently, determining the public or private status of a defamation plaintiff matters immensely.27
tion applied in Minnesota courts); Verity v. USA Today, 436 P.3d 653, 662 (Idaho
2019) (“To prevail on a defamation claim in Idaho, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant: (1) communicated information concerning the plaintiff to others; (2)
the information was defamatory; and (3) the plaintiff was damaged because of the
communication.”).
22. See Mcguire, 932 N.W.2d at 823 (stating defamation plaintiffs must prove
defendant was at least negligently at fault but plaintiff’s status as public official or
public figure requires proof of actual malice as opposed to negligence); see also
Deem, supra note 17, at 803–04 (“A line of Supreme Court Cases . . . requires states
to hold certain defamation plaintiffs to a higher standard of proof.”); Lewis, supra
note 20, at 788–89 (stating Supreme Court precedent requires courts first determine public or private status of defamation plaintiff, then if plaintiff is found to
hold public status, plaintiff bears higher burden of proving statements were made
with actual malice).
23. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
24. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
25. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80 (concluding Constitution mandates
federal rule requiring public officials to prove actual malice to recover damages in
defamation action); see also Lewis, supra note 20, at 790–91 (stating actual malice
burden faced by public officials has become known as New York Times rule).
26. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 821–22 (concluding high school coach was not
public official or public figure, so was not required to satisfy actual malice requirement); see also Brian Markovitz, Note, Public School Teachers as Plaintiffs in Defamation
Suits: Do They Deserve Actual Malice?, 88 GEO L.J. 1953, 1954 (2000) (discussing implications of New York Times rule as applied to public school teachers then stating
public official determination “significantly affects the plaintiff’s chance of winning
a case”).
27. See O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1217 (Utah 2007) (stating
plaintiffs with public official or public figure status forfeit much of their right to
successfully prevail on defamation claim because of actual malice burden); see also
Smith, supra note 18, at 67–68 (arguing Supreme Court’s case-by-case, plaintiff
status determination approach to defamation law fails to “adequately protect the
interests of [both] the plaintiff [and] the defendant in defamation cases” potentially resulting in forum shopping for jurisdictions that have applied plaintiff status
determination favorably).
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A. Why Defamation Plaintiffs Are Not Treated Equal: Public
Officials and the New York Times Rule
The Supreme Court’s holding in New York Times marked the
Court’s first attempt at balancing the competing interests between
state defamation aiming to protect individual’s reputations and
First Amendment rights protecting the freedom of speech.28 The
facts of that case highlight the Constitutional reasoning behind imposing different burdens of proof on public officials as opposed to
private individuals in the context of defamation.29 The plaintiff in
New York Times was an elected official in Montgomery, Alabama and
most of his responsibility as an elected official was to supervise the
Montgomery Police Department.30 In 1960, the New York Times
published an advertisement that brought attention to various acts
of racial harassment and intimidation that were occurring in Montgomery in response to peaceful protests being held in support of
the Civil Rights Movement.31
Specifically, the advertisement alleged various wrongdoings on
behalf of the Montgomery Police Department, although the plaintiff was never directly named in the advertisement.32 After a jury
trial in Montgomery, the plaintiff was awarded $500,000 in damages
28. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256 (“We are required in this case to determine for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections for
speech and press limit a state’s power to award damages in a libel action brought
by a public official against critics of his official conduct.”).
29. See id. at 270 (stating Court was considering merits of case in light of “a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials”); see also O’Connor, 165 P.3d at 1217 (stating Supreme Court justified
New York Times rule “by recalling our nation’s unfortunate experience with attempts to muzzle speech critical of office holders”).
30. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256 (stating respondent was one of three
elected commissioners in Montgomery, Alabama, explaining most of his duties
centered around supervising Police Department, Fire Department, Department of
Cemetery).
31. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Finding The Lost Involuntary Public Figure, 2014
UTAH L. REV. 951, 954 (2014) (noting advertisement focused on racially motivated
police misconduct).
32. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 257 (stating third and sixth paragraphs of
advertisement were basis for plaintiff’s libel action against New York Times). The
third paragraph of the advertisement stated student protestors at Alabama State
University were teargassed by police and subsequently locked out of the dining hall
on campus while the sixth paragraph accused Southern citizens of attemptimg to
harm and intimidate Dr. King. See id. at 257–58 (providing description of student
protests as described in third and sixth paragraphs of advertisement). It is unlikely
the advertisement ruined the plaintiff’s reputation because it did not name him
directly, suggesting the plaintiff filed the claim as an attempt to silence national
criticism of racial violence in Southern states. See Lili Levi, A Closer Look at New York
Times v. Sullivan, UM NEWS (Feb. 22, 2019), https://news.miami.edu/stories/
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and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the verdict, reasoning
the advertisement was libelous per se, and the damages were not
excessive because the New York Times’ failure to retract false contents in the advertisement was proof of implied malice.33 The case
presented a set of circumstances that illustrated a clear threat to
First Amendment rights in areas of prominent public concern, according to the United States Supreme Court.34
With the “profound national commitment” to free debate in
matters of public issue in mind, the Court reversed the Alabama
holdings, instead concluding a defamation plaintiff who holds public office may not be awarded damages in defamation actions without proving the defamatory statement was made with actual
malice.35 The Court defined the actual malice standard as a federal
rule requiring public officials to prove the defendant made a false
communication knowing the communication was false or with reckless disregard as to whether the communication was true.36 The
actual malice requirement set forth by the New York Times rule imposes an extremely high burden on some, but not all defamation
plaintiffs, and the Court carefully explained why the First Amendment calls for public officials to face that heightened burden.37
2019/02/a-closer-look-at-new-york-times-v-sullivan.html [https://perma.cc/V28WGJP9] (arguing plaintiff was making political point by filing defamation claim).
33. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 263–64 (describing Alabama Supreme
Court’s reasoning in affirming trial court’s decision); see also Usman, supra note 31,
at 959–61 (noting Alabama Supreme Court upheld $500,000 jury verdict under
strict liability, libelous per se approaches that United States Supreme Court found
unconstitutional).
34. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 264–65 (stating Supreme Court granted
certiorari because of “importance of the constitutional issues involved,” ultimately
concluding law applied by Alabama was “constitutionally deficient” because it
failed to protect First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights in libel actions brought by public officials).
35. See id. at 264, 279–80 (stating Court’s reasoning was based on nation’s
interest in protecting free debate and noting Court reversed Alabama Supreme
Court because it applied “constitutionally deficient” law); see also Nat Stern, Article,
The Enduring Enigma of Public Official Status in Libel Law, 54 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1205,
1210–11 (2021) (noting actual malice burden was adopted to protect freedom of
debate undhindered by government intrusion).
36. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280 (defining actual malice as “knowledge
that [the defamatory statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not”); see also Usman, supra note 31, at 961 (stating actual malice burden was required because truth as defense did not adequately protect First Amendment rights).
37. See Usman, supra note 31, at 976 (arguing subsequent expansion of actual
malice burden has resulted in more private individuals bearing heightened burden, contrary to United States Supreme Court’s explanation for why actual malice
burden is appropriate for public officials).
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To understand modern defamation actions and the effects the
New York Times rule has on a high school coach’s chance at prevailing in a defamation claim, it is crucial to look at why the Supreme
Court concluded defamation law necessitated some level of “constitutionalization.”38 At the outset, the Supreme Court emphasized
the importance of ensuring defamation actions do not have the capability of violating the First Amendment right to free speech, thus
the Court reasoned an expression of public concern relating to an
aspect of a “major public issue of our time” requires the protection
afforded by the First Amendment.39 Public issues naturally invite
public discourse; therefore, the Constitutional limits of defamation
law require considering the “profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”40
Thus, the New York Times decision marked a specific context in
which state protection against reputational harm is outweighed by
First Amendment rights in the context of defamation law.41
Namely, an alleged reputational harm suffered by a public official is
outweighed by a defendant’s First Amendment rights when the defendant published statements criticizing conduct performed by the
public official in furtherance of the public official’s duties.42 Nota38. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 283 (stating Constitution “delimits a State’s
power” to afford relief to public official plaintiffs who assert libel claims in response to published criticisms of public official’s conduct); see also Deem, supra
note 17, at 800 (discussing high school athletes as defamation plaintiffs while noting Supreme Court’s actual malice requirement is “a significant hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome”); Yonathan A. Arbel & Murat Mungan, Article, The Case Against
Expanding Defamation Law, 71 ALA. L. REV. 453, 465, 467 (2019) (stating New York
Times holding cemented idea that “protection of reputation should sometimes
cede to First Amendment considerations” which led to “constitutionalization” of
defamation law that later expanded beyond public official status).
39. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270–71, 280 (concluding advertisement at
issue was protest of major public issue at time and deserved full constitutional protection by means of requiring proof of actual malice).
40. See id. at 270 (stating Court’s analysis was conducted in light of national
commitment to free public debate). The New York Times Court reasoned that a
truth defense did not adequately protect First Amendment rights because occasional false statements are natural products of free debate and right to free speech
does not depend on whether the speech is popular or truthful. See id. at 270–72
(concluding nation’s commitment to free debate does not promote interpretation
of First Amendment providing protection of free speech to be dependent on falsity
or popularity of speech).
41. See id. at 282–83 (holding defamation actions filed by public officials are
required under First Amendment to prove at least actual malice).
42. See id. at 283 (noting Court’s holding applies in context of criticism of
official conduct); see also O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1217 (Utah
2007) (stating public officials sacrifice right to receive damages suffered from
reputational harm because First Amendment requires public officials to prove actual malice).
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bly absent from the New York Times decision was any explanation of
who exactly was included in the public official category, but it
would not take long for the Supreme Court to revisit the New York
Times rule.43
Two years later, the Court again refused to create a bright-line
rule for the public figure determination and instead reasoned the
determination is adequately guided by the Court’s reasoning in New
York Times.44 In Rosenblatt v. Baer,45 the public official designation
was described to include “at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public
to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of
governmental affairs.”46 As it was in New York Times, the Court was
careful to explain that the actual malice requirement must be
viewed in light of the important value of protecting individual reputation.47 The reach of the public official determination was not explicitly answered by the Court in Rosenblatt, but footnote thirteen of
that decision does provide some important limitations to the determination—“the employee’s position must be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely
apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular
charges in controversy.”48 The public official distinction appeared
to be somewhat settled under New York Times and Rosenblatt, but
subsequent Supreme Court decisions would further complicate the
applicability of the New York Times rule.49
43. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80, 283 n.23 (“We have no occasion
here to determine how far down into the lower ranks of government employees
the ‘public official’ designation would extend for purposes of this rule . . . .”).
44. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1967) (analyzing New York Times
reasoning, stating “[t]here is, first, a strong interest in debate on public issues, and,
second, a strong interest in debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues”).
45. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1967).
46. Id. at 85 (providing conclusive description of type of individual intended
to be included within public official designation).
47. See id. at 86 (stating public official determination should not ignore “important social values which underlie the law of defamation” because society has
strong interest in protecting reputations).
48. See id. at 86 n.13 (“It is suggested that this test might apply to a night
watchman accused of stealing state secrets. But a conclusion that the New York
Times malice standards apply could not be reached merely because a statement
defamatory of some person in government employ catches the public’s interest;
that conclusion would virtually disregard society’s interest in protecting reputation. The employee’s position must be one which would invite public scrutiny and
discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutin[y] and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy.”).
49. For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s expansion of the public
official distinction, see infra notes 50–69 and accompanying text.
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B. Even Those Defamation Plaintiffs Are Not Treated Equally?
Public Officials, Public Figures, and the Expansion of
the New York Times Rule
In some ways, it may appear the definition of public official is
self-explanatory.50 However, three years after New York Times was
decided, a Supreme Court plurality opinion expanded the reach of
the New York Times rule to go beyond public officials, resulting in
increased confusion among lower courts.51 In Curtis Publ’g Co. v.
Butts,52 the Court reasoned that some individuals who do not hold
government positions may be so well-known within public controversies that the public’s interest in debating such figures and controversies is the same as the public’s interest in debating public
official conduct.53
The plaintiff in Butts was an athletic director at the University
of Georgia, although he was employed by a private corporation,
rather than the State of Georgia.54 The Court reasoned that while
the plaintiff was not a public official, he was a well-known figure
connected to an area of public interest and because free speech
“must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the period,” his status as a public figure within an area of
public interest warranted imposition of the New York Times rule.55
50. See N.Y. Times Co., 383 U.S. at 279–83 (citing case law addressing conduct
of public officials such as attorney general or congressman); see also Smith, supra
note 18, at 55 (arguing classification of public officials pose “little difficulty” in
defamation actions).
51. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967) (plurality opinion)
(stating lower courts were divided on whether New York Times rule applies strictly to
public officials or “whether it has a longer reach”); see also id. at 155 (holding
“public figure” who is not public official must show proof of actual malice to prevail on defamation claim).
52. 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion).
53. See id. at 154 (declaring public interest in publications regarding individuals who do not hold public office may be equally as strong as public interest in
discussion of public officials). The Supreme Court decided Butts along with a companion case. See id. at 135 (stating Butts, plus its companion case, posed distinct
sets of facts but both provided opportunity to clarify relationship between First
Amendment, defamation law under New York Times, so Court decided both cases in
one opinion).
54. See id. at 135–36 (describing plaintiff as well-known football coach, previously employed as University of Georgia’s head football coach, who was negotiating professional coaching position at time alleged defamatory statements were
published).
55. See id. at 146–47 (reasoning plaintiff in Butts held important duty of managing athletics of state university, so since free speech protects all areas of public
speech, plaintiff was public figure who had to prove actual malice to give proper
weight to interest of free discussion in areas of public interest).
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Further, Justice Warren reasoned that just as public officials and
public figures both held positions of power in the resolution of
public debate, both categories of individuals also had access to media outlets as a way to address attacks on reputation.56
The Court did not specifically define public figure, but it did
suggest that the plaintiffs may have attained public figure status by
position alone or by purposefully emerging themselves into the
“vortex” of an important public controversy.57 Subsequent to Butts,
the Court again concluded in a plurality opinion that the New York
Times rule extended even further and held it reached any allegedly
defamatory statements that was related to general or public controversy, regardless of a plaintiff’s public or private status.58 Such a
sweepingly broad “public interest” application was rejected three
years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.59 when the Court announced
a public figure distinction more consistent with the reasoning applied in New York Times and Butts. 60
Today, the Gertz decision serves as the primary authority for
modern defamation actions involving public figures because it
aimed to clarify the definition of public figure.61 The Gertz Court
56. See id. at 163–64 (Warren, J., concurring) (“This blending of positions and
power has also occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do not hold
public office at the moment are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution
of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of
concern to society at large . . . And surely as a class these ‘public figures’ have as
ready access as ‘public officials’ to mass media of communication, both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities.” (citations
omitted)).
57. See id. at 155 (plurality opinion) (“Butts may have attainted [public figure] status by position alone and Walker by his purposeful activity amounting to a
thrusting of his personality into the ‘vortex’ of an important public controversy
. . . .” (citations omitted)).
58. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971) (rejecting private
versus public distinction, instead concluding “if a matter is a subject of public or
general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved, or because in some sense the individual did not ‘voluntarily’
choose to become involved”).
59. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
60. See id. at 343–44 (stating balancing individual’s right to protect reputation
with public’s right to free speech requires more manageable approach than broad
public interest approach); see also id. at 345–46 (“For these reasons we conclude
that the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal
remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual. The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality
would abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find
unacceptable.”).
61. See William M. Krogh, The Anonymous Public Figure: Influence Without Notoriety And The Defamation Plaintiff, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 839, 845–46 (2008) (stating
Gertz is “principal authority on the public figure doctrine” which rejected broad
matters of public interest rule); see also Lewis, supra note 20, at 792 (“Recognizing
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concluded the plaintiff, an attorney for a family in a civil lawsuit
action, was not rendered a public figure by representing a client
that had been at the forefront of a controversial murder trial, thus,
the New York Times rule was not appropriate for analyzing a defamation claim against a newspaper.62 In refusing to classify the plaintiff
as a public figure, the Court attempted to better define “public figure” and create better safeguards to private individuals’ interest in
protecting reputation by creating three “types” of public figures.63
The three categories of public figures identified by the Gertz Court
include: (1) all-purpose public figures; (2) limited-purpose public
figures; and (3) involuntary public figures.64
As applied to the plaintiff in Gertz, the Court concluded the
plaintiff was not an all-purpose public figure because although he
had been an active community member and legal scholar, he had
achieved no general fame in the community.65 Similarly, the plaintiff did not become a limited-purpose public figure by representing
his client because he did not “thrust himself” into the public issue
of the murder trial and he did not attempt to grab the public’s
attention to influence the resolution of the public issue.66 For high
school coaches, this means that defamation law may not treat all
high school coaches the same, because many high school coaches
who reasonably assume they would be deemed private individuals
that the New York Times rule applied to ‘public figures,’ the [Gertz] Court attempted
to further define the status.” (footnote omitted)).
62. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (concluding Plaintiff was not public figure because Plaintiff did not “thrust himself into the vortex” of that public issue nor
attempt to influence its outcome by representing client).
63. See id. at 344–45 (describing ways individual may become public figure);
see also id. at 345 (“[A private individual] has relinquished no part of his interest in
the protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling
call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus,
private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and
public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.”).
64. See id. at 351 (describing all-purpose public figure as individual who
achieves “such pervasive fame or notoriety” that individual is public figure for all
purposes, all contexts); see also id. (describing limited-purpose public figures as
individual who “voluntarily injects [themselves] or is drawn into a particular public
controversy, so they become public figure for limited range of issues”); id. at 345
(describing involuntary public figures as being “exceedingly rare” because it is defined as individual who gains notoriety, fame through no purposeful action).
65. See id. at 351–52 (“We would not lightly assume that a citizen’s participation in community and professional affairs rendered him a public figure for all
purposes. Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community,
and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be
deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life.”).
66. See id. at 352 (“[The plaintiff] plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public’s attention in an attempt to
influence its outcome.”).
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by courts are actually faced with the potential that both the public
official and public figure distinctions will be roadblocks to the success of a defamation claim.67 For high school coaches, athletes, and
many other individuals, the public figure distinction is not predictable because courts disagree on how to apply the Gertz public figure
standard.68 More commonly for high school coaches, the public
official distinction will be the most likely roadblock to a successful
defamation claim because most coaches are employed by a public
school in dual positions of coach and teacher.69
C. Minnesota Calling a Foul in McGuire v. Bowlin
Two years after the Gertz decision, one judge observed that defining public figure was “much like trying to nail a jelly fish to the
wall” and that observation remains true, leaving defamation plaintiffs facing very similar circumstances with very different burdens to
bear.70 Determining whether a high school coach must prove actual malice to prevail on a defamation claim is “much like trying to
nail a jelly fish to the wall” because there is often a question of
whether the coach is a public official and whether the coach is a
public figure.71 In 2019, the Minnesota Supreme Court in McGuire
v. Bowlin held that high school coaches are private individuals for
67. See Strauss, supra note 20, at 53–54 (stating most athletes are public
figures due to either fame or efforts to grab public’s attention, but determination
varies on case-by-case basis); see also O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214,
1220–21 (Utah 2007) (refusing to classify high school coach as public official
based on coach’s employment with public high school).
68. See Krogh, supra note 61, at 849 (arguing public figure designation “has
been notoriously difficult to assess.”).
69. See e.g., Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1195 (Ohio 1984)
(refusing to classify high school coach as public official based on dual teaching/
coaching positions); see also Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d
1101, 1103 (Tex. 1978) (classifying high school coach as public official based on
teacher-coach position).
70. See Rosanova v. Playboy Enter., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976),
aff’d, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978) (commenting on difficulty posed by public or
private individual after Supreme Court expanded reach of public status in Gertz);
see also Erik Walker, Comment, Defamation Law: Public Figures – Who Are They?, 45
BAYLOR. L. REV. 955, 964–77 (1993) (analyzing defamation jurisprudence, arguing
public figure criteria under Gertz has led to widespread disagreements among
courts for thirty years).
71. See McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 828 (Minn. 2019) (applying separate public official versus public figure analyses, concluding high school basketball
coach was neither public official or public figure); see also O’Connor v.
Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1220–21 (Utah 2007) (determining high school
coach was not public official but declining to determine whether coach was public
figure).
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the purpose of defamation.72 The facts of McGuire and the Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis illustrate why applying the actual malice burden to high school coaches is an inappropriate application
of the New York Times rule.73
1. McGuire and its Facts: The Road Leading to Defamation
Nathan McGuire had been coaching basketball for nearly ten
years until his coaching career was cut short when his school district
decided his coaching contract would not be renewed for the upcoming season.74 Mr. McGuire was hired to coach the Woodbury
High School varsity girls’ basketball team in 2012 and led the team
to a winning season.75 During his first season as head coach, Mr.
McGuire and other coaching staff removed a player from the
team’s upcoming tournament roster because the player was allegedly acting unsportsmanlike during a game.76 According to the
defamation complaint, the player’s removal from the roster was not
intended to be permanent; however, when the player was informed
of the removal, she became “visibly upset” and quit the team.77
Subsequently, the player’s mother sent emails arguing her
daughter’s removal was wrongful and that she would be filing a formal complaint.78 Ten months after the player quit, she and another member of the basketball team were cited by police for
disorderly conduct after vandalizing Mr. McGuire’s home.79 The
parents of those two players were later named as defendants in Mr.
72. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 828–29 (finding high school basketball coach
was not public official or public figure).
73. See id. (analyzing Supreme Court public official, public figure precedent
to conclude under ordinary circumstances, high school coaches are private individuals in defamation actions).
74. See Pl.’s Complaint at 12–15, 60, McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819
(2019) (No. 82CV156030) [hereinafter Complaint] (stating Plaintiff began coaching in 2004, coached at four different schools prior to being removed from coaching position in 2014).
75. See id. at 15–16 (noting basketball team had ten wins and eighteen loss
record in 2011–2012, but when Plaintiff became head coach, team earned its
nineteen win and ten loss record, placing the team third in its team conference).
76. See id. at 17–20 (alleging Plaintiff made decision to remove player from
upcoming tournament after Plaintiff received email from referee stating player
acted disrespectfully in previous game).
77. See id. at 19, 22 (stating disciplined player quit team after removal from
tournament roster and did not finish present season or try out for next season).
78. See id. at 20 (noting two week period after player’s removal, player’s
mother sent accusatory emails threatening to file formal complaint, arguing Plaintiff lied about player’s behavior and player’s removal was “false pretense”).
79. See id. at 21 (stating Plaintiff’s home was vandalized three nights in row,
vandals identified as two athletes coached by Plaintiff, including disciplined
player).
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McGuire’s defamation complaint.80 The next basketball season, a
new player joined the team and was familiar with Mr. McGuire because he coached her two years prior at a different school.81 According to his complaint, prior to that season commencing, the
player’s parents arranged a meeting where they asked about their
daughter’s status on the varsity team, but they were dissatisfied
when Mr. McGuire stated he did not know how much playing time
their daughter would receive.82 Those parents were later named as
defendants in Mr. McGuire’s defamation action.83 The complaint
tells a story known well in the area of high school sports, the story
of parents becoming upset at high school coaches after their children are refused adequate playing time.84
Throughout the course of Mr. McGuire’s defamation action it
became abundantly clear that there was more to the story than disgruntled parents.85 According to the parents of three other players
on the team, Mr. McGuire inappropriately touched players, flirted
with players, and used vulgar language at practices.86 For example,
one defendant was concerned about Mr. McGuire’s conduct be80. See id. at 4–5, 17–21 (naming parents of two players cited for vandalism as
defendants in Plaintiff’s defamation complaint).
81. See id. at 23–24 (stating new player was coached by Plaintiff at different
school, transferred to Woodbury High School as freshman expressing interest in
joining Plaintiff’s upcoming 2013–2014 team).
82. See id. at 25–26 (alleging player’s parents requested Plaintiff inform them
of player’s playing time on varsity roster prior to start of competitive season before
coaching staff finalized roster). After the plaintiff refused to inform the parents
about playing time, the parents turned to an influential parent in Woodbury High
School’s basketball program, the Minnesota State High School League, Woodbury
High School’s administration, and the school district to complain about the plaintiff’s coaching, encouraging Coach Mcguire’s removal from the coaching position.
See id. at 25–26 (describing multiple avenues parents pursued in attempt to file
complaint regarding Plaintiff’s coaching).
83. See id. at 2–3, 32 (noting parents who complained about playing time as
well as parents of two players cited for vandalizing Plaintiff’s home were named
defendants in complaint).
84. See Rick Wolff, Parents v. Coaches: Confronting The Issue Of Playing Time, ASK
COACH WOLFF (Jun. 26, 2021), https://www.askcoachwolff.com/blog/parents-vcoaches-confronting-the-issue-of-playing-time-1 [https://perma.cc/JX27-EAAM]
(stating parents’, children’s complaints regarding playing time is “key issue” in
youth sports). Disagreements concerning playing time can lead to smear compaigns against coaches, but the disagreements can sometimes turn physical and
present potential dangers to coaches and their families. See id. (recounting incident of parent suffering gunshot wound after coach shot parent in self-defense
because parent had angrily confronted coach about child’s playing time on multiple occasions, began confronting coach at his home).
85. See McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Minn. 2019) (summarizing
parents’ allegations).
86. See id. (describing some allegations but leaving out other allegations of
coaching conduct addressed at lower court level).
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cause their daughter stated Mr. McGuire would grab players by
their shoulders or jerseys, single players out, and throw basketballs
in a fit of rage.87 Similarly, other parents were concerned with excessively long daily practices and punishments imposed by Mr.
McGuire.88
In December 2013, the defendants and some of the players
gathered to discuss the concerns they shared regarding Mr. McGuire’s coaching.89 One defendant noted that Mr. McGuire had
been fired from his previous coaching position after parents complained to the school administration.90 Less than a month later,
the same defendant, together with one other defendant, filed a formal complaint to the Minnesota Department of Education alleging
Mr. McGuire was maltreating players on the team.91 Soon after filing the maltreatment complaint, three of the defendants met with
the Woodbury school administration to discuss the coaching conduct at issue.92 A law firm was hired by the school administration to
investigate the allegations and placed Mr. McGuire on paid administrative leave while the investigation was conducted.93 The investigation ultimately rejected the claims of physical touching; however,
it did conclude Mr. McGuire failed to consider the emotional wellbeing of players.94 One year after the school district’s internal in87. See McGuire v. Bowlin, No. 82-CV-15-6030, 2018 WL 6273533, at *1 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2018) (summarizing acts of misconduct Mr. McGuire allegedly
committed as coach).
88. See id. (stating parent of player who was removed from roster for poor
behavior was concerned about length of practice as well as child’s removal from
basketball roster in 2012–2013 basketball season).
89. See id. at *2 (noting December 29, 2013 meeting involved discussion of
Plaintiff’s alleged physical, verbal abuse as Woodbury High School coach in addition to one defendant’s allegations of Plaintiff’s conduct in previous coaching
positions).
90. See id. (stating during meeting, one defendant encouraged parents to
complain to school administration because Plaintiff was asked to resign from previous coaching position at different school after those parents complained).
91. See id. (noting soon after December meeting among Defendants, certain
Defendants filed formal maltreatment complaint to Minnesota alleging abuse of
four players coached by Plaintiff).
92. See id. (providing timeline leading to Plaintiff’s removal, beginning with
formal maltreatment complaint filed, ending with defendants meeting with school
administration which lead to Plaintiff being placed on paid leave).
93. See id. (describing actions taken by school administration after meeting
with defendants, including hiring law firm to investigate parent allegations of verbal, physical abuse against players).
94. See id. (“The investigation yielded a report that largely rejected claims of
physical improprieties such as pushing or massaging players, but found several of
the complaints were substantiated, including that McGuire failed to consider the
emotional well-being of his players, yelled and swore in front of players, and ran a
demanding and uncompromising practice schedule.”).
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vestigation, the Minnesota Department of Education concluded its
investigation and found no evidence of maltreatment, but the
school district ultimately decided not to renew Mr. McGuire’s
coaching contract for a third season.95
According to the complaint Mr. McGuire filed, he was a topchoice candidate for a head coach position at another high school;
however, he did not receive the position, allegedly due to the defendants’ ongoing complaints.96 After being removed from his
coaching position at Woodbury High School, Mr. McGuire continued to be a topic of concern for at least one of the named defendants.97 Five months after his removal as head coach, a defendant
sent an email to another parent stating “last she heard,” Mr. McGuire was in jail.98 Again, nine months after his removal, the defendant sent another email containing a news article about stolen
funds with a note alleging that Mr. McGuire was involved in the
stolen funds case.99 Mr. McGuire’s defamation complaint sets the
stage for a seemingly simple defamation case because he claimed
the defendants’ statements and maltreatment-of-minors complaint
harmed his reputation in the community, the comments and allegations were false, and the defendants were at some level of fault.100
95. See id. (stating on March 14, 2014, School District did not renew Plaintiff’s
coaching contract, while Minnesota Department of Education’s investigation ended in March 2015, concluding players were not maltreated).
96. See Complaint, supra note 74, at 71 (“With respect to one interview that
McGuire received, he was told that he was the preferred candidate and that if he
did not receive the job, it would be due to his non-renewal by Woodbury High
School and the then-pending complaints. McGuire was not offered that job.”); see
also id. (discussing Mr. McGuire’s search for coaching positions after his termination including that he applied to five positions, but only received interviews for
two).
97. See McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Minn. 2019) (stating one
defendant, whose daughter had transferred high schools prior to Mr. McGuire’s
removal, continued to make statements about Mr. McGuire after his removal).
98. See id. (describing email sent by defendant to another parent alleging Mr.
McGuire was in jail in August 2014, writing, “Last I heard yesterday he was recently
put in jail . . . I will find out the truth and call the [Department of Education]
today and find out”).
99. See id. (“In December [Defendant] sent that same parent’s spouse a photo
of a newspaper article titled ‘Woodbury man sentenced to jail in stolen funds case,’
accompanied by a text that said ‘I know we don’t talk anymore but this was part of
the Woodbury stuff with [McGuire] that was going on. This guy too got busted.’ It
is undisputed that the subject of the article was not McGuire.”).
100. See Complaint, supra note 74, at 77–85 (establishing elements of defamation as applied to Defendants’ maltreatment complaint, to other various statements). The Complaint reflects the lack of certainty defamation plaintiffs are
faced with due to the public figure and public official distinctions; for example,
the Complaint is careful to allege the statements were made with actual malice or
negligence, presumably because Mr. McGuire was aware of the undesirable possibility of being faced with the actual malice standard due to his coaching position.
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However, two years of ongoing litigation shows that Mr. McGuire’s
defamation claim was not so simple, and according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, the merits of the claim had not yet been properly determined.101
2. Why the Minnesota Supreme Court Called a Foul: McGuire and its
Reasoning
The two years of litigation revolved around determining
whether Mr. McGuire was a public official, and if so, whether he
proved the defendants’ false statements and reports were made
with actual malice.102 The district court granted summary judgment to each defendant after concluding Mr. McGuire was a public
official and finding the record provided no evidence suggesting the
statements were made with actual malice.103 The court did note
inconsistency among state courts, before explaining that public
school teachers in Minnesota are considered public officials because they act with the authority of the government and policy considerations warrant extra constitutional protections to statements
made about a teacher’s conduct.104
Guided by the considerations applied to teachers, the district
court reasoned Mr. McGuire, as a varsity basketball coach, was a
public official because he controlled the entire high school basketSee id. at 80–81 (“Those statements were knowingly false, or in the alternative were
made in reckless disregard of the truth, tended to injure McGuire’s reputation,
lowered him in the estimation of the community . . . . In addition, and in the
alternative, those statements were made with actual malice . . . Defendants were
negligent in the publication of these statements . . . .”).
101. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 822 (remanding Mr. McGuire’s defamation
claim to district court, then ordering lower court to remove actual malice burden
to make judgment based on merits of Mr. McGuire’s claim under his private individual status).
102. See id. at 822–23 (court of appeals affirmed trial court decision to grant
defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Mr. McGuire was public official and Plaintiff failed to prove actual malice); see also Complaint, supra note 74, at
80–81 (indicating Mr. McGuire may have anticipated roadblock of actual malice
because he alleged Defendants acted with actual malice, or alternatively,
negligence).
103. See McGuire v. Bowlin, No. 82-CV-15-6030, 2018 WL 6273533, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2018) (summarizing then affirming trial court holding).
104. See id. (citing Elstrom v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 270, 533 N.W.2d 51, 56
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995)) (noting teachers are considered public officials in Minnesota because public policy favors educators, teachers act with governmental authority, abuse of power by teachers may impact many people, and society has great
interest in positions requiring special trust and special authority). The district
court’s test for determining public official status was derived from Rosenblatt and
looks to whether the position allows the individual to assert the authority of the
government. See id. at 11–12 (citing Rosenblatt, plus Minnesota precedent, to explain how public official status is determined).
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ball program and his position as coach affected many lives in the
community.105 Mr. McGuire appealed and the court of appeals, relying on United Stated Supreme Court precedent, looked to
whether a high school coach is an employee “able to assert the authority of the government while performing his duties.”106 Just as
the lower court did, the court of appeals reasoned a high school
coach’s ability to assert government authority was analogous to a
teachers’ ability; therefore, because teachers were public officials
the court concluded the same classification applied to high school
coaches.107 The court first reasoned that coaches, like teachers,
play a “formative role” in the lives of students and communities as a
whole; thus, the public has an interest in the suitability of high
school coaches.108 Moreover, the court did not conclude whether
all high school coaches would be considered public officials, but
because Mr. McGuire supervised other basketball coaches, spent extensive amounts of time with players, and had extensive control
over team policies, the court concluded his specific coaching position at Woodbury rendered him a public official.109
105. See id. at 12 (“Not only was McGuire the Varsity team coach, he was also
in charge of the entire girls’ basketball program at Woodbury High School. His
position afforded him significant control over the shape and management of all
four girls’ basketball teams at Woodbury High School, including considerable authority in hiring the coaches for the other teams. Further, any abuse by McGuire of
his position would affect many lives, including the players on all four squads, their
families, and other members of the community with an interest in the high
school’s teams, and this position involves the investiture of societal trust.”) (footnote omitted).
106. See McGuire, 2018 WL 6273533, at *3 (stating Minnesota follows Rosenblatt
criteria but focuses its public official determination primarily on plaintiff’s ability
to assert authority of government) (citing Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 521,
523 (Minn. 1991)).
107. See id. at *3–4 (stating high school sports coaches and high school teachers are analogous for purpose of defamation law, but declining to conclude
whether all coaches are considered public officials).
108. See id. at *3 (“High school sports play a formative role in the lives of
student athletes and a significant role in their families and in the community that
watches from the bleachers and pays the school levies. The coaches who direct
young athletes enjoy positions of trust and authority, the abuse of which may affect
many lives. Accordingly, as with teachers, the public has an interest in coaches’
qualifications and conduct.”).
109. See id. at *4 (“Although we need not decide here whether all public high
school coaches are public officials, the undisputed facts persuade us that McGuire
was a public official . . . [Mr. McGuire] had extensive contact with his student
athletes during hours-long daily practices and had a substantial impact on their
lives, as demonstrated by the very complaints at issue in this litigation. As head of
the high school basketball program, he had a significant supervisory and administrative role. Five coaches worked under him in the program, three of whom he
hired. And he established the structure and priorities of the program with respect
to team rosters, practice schedules, and policies regarding missed practices and
player discipline.”).
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The court of appeals was not insensitive to the difficulties and
criticism coaches are subjected to, but its concern was misplaced
and did not afford proper weight to the huge negative impact defamatory statements can have on coaches like Mr. McGuire.110 The
court of appeals concluded the entire defamation action failed as a
matter of law because the evidence did not show any of the defendants’ statements or conduct were made with actual malice.111 The
appellate court remarked “that [Defendant] would contemplate, or
even hope, that McGuire would be jailed for maltreatment may suggest her subjective ill will toward McGuire but does not establish
actual malice to support a defamation claim.”112 From that remark
it is clear the court of appeals acknowledged just how harmful certain statements that lead to defamation actions can be, but even if
those claims were proven false and reputationally harmful, local
high school basketball coaches like Mr. McGuire must show the defendant made the claim knowingly or recklessly.113
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not agree with limiting relief in defamation actions brought by high school coaches to cases
where actual malice is proven, and the court’s reasoning illustrates
why the New York Times rule, as explained by the United States Supreme Court, does not apply to high school coaches.114
The Minnesota Supreme Court began its reasoning in McGuire
by focusing on the public official determination as established in
New York Times, Rosenblatt, and the most recent Minnesota decision
that highlighted the public official determination.115 At the outset,
110. See id. at *4 (“We appreciate the challenges that coaches face in addressing parents’ criticisms . . . [c]oaches like McGuire . . . regularly field both collective
and individual complaints on topics ranging from the program’s competitive success, to coaching methods and style, to a particular child’s playing time.”); see also
id. (concluding challenges faced by coaches do not outweigh public’s interest in
criticizing public officials).
111. See id. *4–6 (holding Mr. McGuire failed to prove any defendant made
statements with actual malice); see also McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 829–30,
830 n.6 (Minn. 2019) (stating district court concluded only one defendant was
granted summary judgment based on Mr. McGuire’s public official status, while
other defendants were granted summary judgment based on immunity).
112. See McGuire, 2018 WL 6273533, at *5 (discussing defendant’s filing of
allegedly false maltreatment claim with Minnesota Department of Education).
113. See id. at *5 (concluding defendant’s potential ill will did not suggest
false claim was filed knowingly or in reckless disregard of truth, but acknowledging
comments made by defendant went as far as to allege Mr. McGuire was jailed).
114. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 827 n. 5 (agreeing with Utah Supreme Court
that high school coaches are not type of individuals classified as public officials or
giving rise to heightened actual malice burden) (citing O’Connor v. Burningham,
165 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Utah 2007)).
115. See id. at 823–24 (beginning its reasoning with explanation of public figure distinction before looking to Minnesota defamation jurisprudence to highlight
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the McGuire court noted that any criterion which allows the public
official status to extend to the lowest level of public employees
would be antithetical to United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.116 Therefore, the court stated, “our inquiry does not end
with whether McGuire was performing governmental duties directly
related to the public interest; instead, we weigh society’s interest in
open, public debate about the performance of the duties of a high
school basketball coach against society’s interest in protecting
reputation.”117
At the first step of the public official inquiry, the Minnesota
Supreme Court concluded Mr. McGuire’s duties included what
many would see as stereotypical duties of a high school basketball
coach, such as scheduling games, deciding playing time, and making strategic game decisions.118 Further, it was correct in concluding the public does have an interest in the duties of a high school
coach, but the public’s interest in results of high school athletics
does not outweigh a coach’s interest in protecting their reputation.119 In other words, the court balanced Mr. McGuire’s interest
in reputation against the public’s interest in how he executes his
coaching duties to conclude Mr. McGuire’s interest in reputation
outweighed the public’s interest.120 In light of balancing those
criteria used in Minnesota when determining public official or private individual
status); see also Britton v. Koep, 470 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Minn. 1991) (identifying
three criteria to apply when evaluating defamation plaintiffs’ private individual or
public official status).
116. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d. at 824 (noting Minnesota case law and United
States Supreme Court precedent, which concludes public official determination is
not intended to reach lower levels of government employees) (citing Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979)).
117. See id. (reasoning public official inquiry must go further than governmental duties related to public interest because if inquiry ended there, public official determination could reach to all levels of public employees).
118. See id. at 822 (describing duties given to Mr. McGuire as oversight of
assistant coaches, strategic decision making, schedule making, general oversight of
basketball program); see also id. at 824 (observing no party contested premise
coaching duties include deciding playing time, disciplining players, organizing
practices, encouraging players to improve skill). The Minnesota Supreme Court
also noted the parties disputed whether Mr. McGuire had the power to hire new
coaches, but whether he had the power to hire coaches was not dispositive to the
court’s determination. See id. at 825 (noting Mr. McGuire argued he did not hire
coaches while Defendants argued he did hire coaches).
119. See id. at 825 (“On balance, the interest society has in the execution of
these duties does not overcome the interest in protecting reputation . . . . Undoubtedly, the public has some ‘interest’ in the duties McGuire carried out, in the
sense that members of the public pay attention to school sports, including the
results of a team’s games. But in our view this interest is not enough.”).
120. See id. (observing intention behind public figure designation was to balance community’s interest in circulation of information with private individuals
harmed by defamatory statements).
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competing interests, the McGuire court held that for government
duties to support a public official determination, those duties must
relate to the “core functions of government, such as safety and public order” and coaching duties simply do not relate to a core function of government.121 As the court pointed out, in cases where
courts have applied the public official status, the plaintiffs held positions such as commissioner or police officer, roles that clearly impact the public at large and are core functions of government.122
At the second step of its public official inquiry, the court concluded issues pertaining to high school sport teams are not issues
the public has a “strong interest in debating,” but it did acknowledge that high school athletics are an important aspect of communities.123 Importantly, the McGuire court rejected the argument
that the public issue at hand was Mr. McGuire’s conduct as a coach,
rather than the success of the team as a whole.124 The court reasoned that argument was inappropriate because United States Supreme Court jurisprudence makes it clear that the public official
determination looks to a public official’s role within society, not the
public official’s specific conduct within that public position.125 Mr.
McGuire’s position was head coach of a public high school basket121. See id. (balancing interest in reputation with interest in free speech, concluding coaching duties in public schools are “ancillary to core functions of government; put simply, basketball is not fundamental to democracy”).
122. See id. (noting plaintiff in New York Times was elected official responsible
for supervising police department). The McGuire court also noted two previous
defamation cases where the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded members of a
grand jury and probation officers are public officials. See id. (observing grand jury
members were public officials because grand juries have ability to implicate others
for crimes (citing Standke v. B.E. Darby & Sons, Inc., 193 N.W.2d 139, 143–144
(Minn. 1971))); see also id. (noting in most recent case in which public official
designation was at issue, Minnesota Supreme Court concluded probation officer
who had power to arrest juveniles was public official (citing Britton v. Koep, 470
N.W.2d 518, 520 (Minn. 1991))).
123. See id. at 825–26 (stating second step of its public official inquiry looks to
whether Mr. McGuire held position significantly able to influence resolution of
public issues as informed by Rosenblatt); see also id. at 826 (“In determining what
constitutes a ‘public issue,’ we are guided by the Supreme Court’s statement in
Rosenblatt regarding the basis for the public official designation—that society has ‘a
strong interest in debate on public issues, and . . . a strong interest in debate about
those persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of
those issues.’ ” (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966))).
124. See id. (rejecting Defendant’s argument public issue relates to coaches’
conduct because it “erroneously shifts” public official inquiry away from Mr. McGuire’s role); see also O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Utah 2007)
(concluding public officials are individuals whose role allows them to impact public policy which is unlike coaches whose role impacts high school sports).
125. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 826 (quoting Rosenblatt, concluding public
official inquiry must look to plaintiff’s specific position, not to specific conduct
within position); see also Stern, supra note 35, at 1217 (observing many courts make
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ball team, a position that did not give him the ability to substantially
influence the resolution of public debates.126
At its final step of the public official inquiry, the court determined Mr. McGuire did not have, or appear to have, “substantial
responsibility” for government affairs or “control” over government
affairs.127 The court pointed out the major reason for why high
school coaches often find themselves battling the public official distinction in defamation suits, because Mr. McGuire coached a public
school basketball team and public schools are part of the government, he was technically engaged in a government affair when
coaching the team.128 However, the technicality is not enough to
support public official status because the extent of a high school
coach’s engagement in government affairs is determining game
strategy for the government’s publicly funded high school basketball team.129
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that Mr. McGuire,
as a high school coach, did not meet any three applicable criteria in
the public official inquiry.130 As a last note on Mr. McGuire’s status
as a public official (or lack thereof), the court pointed out that the
majority of other jurisdictions have also held that high school
public official determination simply by inspecting defamation plaintiff’s job title
and duties).
126. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 826 (concluding position held by Mr. McGuire did not give him ability to “influence significantly the resolution of public
issues”); see also Kosta Tiodorovic, What Is It Like to Be a High School Coach? Part 1:
Struggles, BENCHBOSS (Mar. 30, 2021), https://benchboss.ai/what-is-it-like-to-be-ahigh-school-coach-part-1-struggles/ [https://perma.cc/7UAT-MMMF] (observing
high school coaches have substantial influence in local youth sport programs but
do not influence broader political or social affairs in community).
127. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 826 (applying final public official criteria
before holding Mr. McGuire did not have, or appear to have, substantial responsibility or control related to government affairs); see also Usman, supra note 31, at
979–80 (observing courts applying public official designation expansively consider
public school actors public officials at this step of inquiry based on importance of
school system as opposed to control over broader government policies).
128. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 826 (stating Mr. McGuire “technically engaged in government affairs” as coach of public school basketball team); see also
Markovitz, supra note 26, at 1970 (arguing public school teachers are low level
government actors but exert little to no control over government policy).
129. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 826 (comparing high school coaches to public officials in other cases where plaintiffs had ability to investigate public crimes or
indict others before concluding high school coaches’ extent of control, of responsibility, in government affairs is determining strategy for athletic teams); see also
Markovitz, supra note 26, at 1971 (suggesting public teachers’ extent of government control is not enough to render teachers public officials because even basic
classroom strategies may be challenged to higher level government officials such as
school superintendant).
130. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 827 (“Analysis of the Britton criteria show that
McGuire is not a public official.”).
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coaches are not public officials.131 In particular, the court quoted
the Utah Supreme Court decision in O’Connor v. Burningham132 as
being the most persuasive reasoning for why high school coaches
are not public officials.133
Although the lower courts did not address whether Mr. McGuire was a public figure, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded
that Mr. McGuire was not a limited-purpose public figure.134 Relying on Gertz and Minnesota precedent, the court looked to whether:
“1) a public controversy existed; 2) whether the plaintiff played a
meaningful role in the controversy; and 3) whether the allegedly
defamatory statement related to the controversy.”135 Imperative to
the public figure determination is the requirement that the public
issue must be in the arena of public debate before the time the defamatory statements were made.136 The court concluded there was
no public controversy surrounding Mr. McGuire until after the alleged defamation occurred; therefore, that controversy could not
support concluding Mr. McGuire was a limited-purpose public
figure.137
Moreover, as it did in its public official inquiry, the Minnesota
Supreme court rejected the argument that high school sports in
general served as a public controversy supporting the conclusion
that Mr. McGuire was a limited-purpose public figure.138 The court
131. See id. (citing other jurisdictions that have decided whether high school
coach is public official for purpose of defamation actions).
132. 165 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2007).
133. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 827–28 (quoting O’Connor, stating reasoning
is “particularly persuasive”).
134. See id. at 828 (determining whether Mr. McGuire was limited-purpose
public figure in interest of judicial economy because it was cited as argument by
respondents but lower courts did not address public figure argument).
135. See id. (stating factors court must find for plaintiff to be limited-purpose
public figure); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352 (1974) (concluding plaintiff was not public figure because he played minimal role in public
controversy, did not thrust himself into public issues, did not attempt to influence
outcome of public issues).
136. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 829 (citing Gertz, declaring public figure inquiry focuses on public controversy at issue before defamatory conduct occurred,
not controversies discovered after alleged defamatory conduct occurred); see also
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (“[I]t is preferable to reduce the public figure question . . . by
looking to the nature and extend of an individual’s participation in the particular
controversy giving rise to the defamation.” (emphasis added)).
137. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 829 (stating no public controversy existed
until after alleged defamation occurred, thus, controversy did not make Mr. McGuire limited-purpose public figure).
138. See id. (rejecting respondent’s argument high school sports were public
controversy because high school sports are general activity not capable of
resolution).
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reasoned that even under narrower grounds, such as the controversy of whether Mr. McGuire was “effectively coaching the team to
win as many games as possible,” the public figure determination
would not be supported because there was no evidence that any
controversy around effective coaching existed and even if it did, the
alleged defamatory statements did not relate to Mr. McGuire’s ability to secure team victories.139
III. HIGH SCHOOL COACHES, CRITICISM, AND THE NEW YORK
TIMES RULE: ACTUAL MALICE AT PLAY IN HIGH SCHOOL
ATHLETICS
This Comment argues that the public versus private analysis
applied in McGuire best serves the competing values of the public’s
interest in debating and criticizing wrongdoings in high school
sports and a high school coach’s interest in protecting reputation
and receiving legal redress.140 Part A of this Section provides summaries of various state precedent addressing the actual malice standard’s applicability to high school coaches.141 Part B of this Section
shows that classifying high school coaches as public individuals is
both legally unsound and against public policy.142 First, applying
the New York Times rule to high school coaches is against Supreme
Court precedent and contrary to the purpose of the New York Times
rule.143 Next, in classifying the plaintiff in McGuire as a private individual, the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the correct legal
analysis and gave proper weight to common policy issues experienced in sports at the high school level.144 Finally, the common
experience of high school coaches, athletes, and athlete parents
presents strong public policy considerations in opposition to classi139. See id. (reasoning public figure determination would not be appropriate
under narrower argument about Mr. McGuire’s effectiveness as coach because defamatory statements related to his conduct towards players, rather than his conduct in coaching team to victories).
140. For further discussion of the McGuire decision, see supra notes 102–139
and accompanying text. For discussion of why the McGuire analysis properly protects the community and high school coaches, see infra notes 277–299 and accompanying text.
141. For further discussion of case law outside of Minnesota, see infra notes
151–227 and accompanying text.
142. For discussion of how applying the heightened public official or public
figure burden to high school coaches misapplies defamation precedent and has
negative impacts on high school coaches, see infra notes 252–299 and accompanying text.
143. For discussion of Supreme Court precedent and its inapplicability to
high school coaches, see infra notes 258–276 and accompanying text.
144. For further discussion of why McGuire is legally correct and promotes
public policy, see infra notes 277–292 and accompanying text.
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fying the coaches as public individuals for the purpose of defamation claims.145
A. Outside of Minnesota: Foul or No Foul? Defamation, High
School Coaches, and the New York Times Rule at Play
The McGuire holding makes it clear that in Minnesota, high
school coaches situated in similar circumstances as Mr. McGuire
will not be considered public officials and it would be unusual for
such coaches to fall within the parameters of a public figure.146
However, some states disagree and interpret Supreme Court defamation jurisprudence as supporting, sometimes even requiring,
that coaches prove actual malice before being afforded relief in a
defamation action.147 Nonetheless, the majority of courts who have
addressed the New York Times rule applicability to youth sport
coaches have held that the coaches are not public officials, regardless of whether the coach is employed by a public school system.148
This Comment analyzes the reasoning utilized in cases where courts
have either applied, or refused to apply, the actual malice standard
to high school sports coaches.149 The Comment also briefly looks
to the actual malice standard in defamation cases filed by professional sport figures to illustrate why high school coaches, unlike
145. For further discussion of the high school sports experience and how it
supports classifying coaches as private individuals, see infra notes 293–299 and accompanying text.
146. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d 819, 826–27, 829 (Minn. 2019) (concluding
coaching position compensated by government paycheck is insufficient to render
high school coach public official); see also id. at 829 (concluding high school sports
are not controversies rendering high school coaches limited-purpose public
figures).
147. See Johnston v. Corinthian Television Co., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla.
1978) (relying on Rosenblatt to conclude coaches in public school system are public
officials because there is “no higher community involvement touching more families and carrying more public interest than the public school system”).
148. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 827 (noting weight of authority in other jurisdictions support concluding high school coaches are not public officials); see also
Peter S. Cane, Comment, Defamation of Teachers: Behind the Times?, 56 FORD. L. REV.
1191, 1197–98 (1988) (explaining courts disagree on whether teachers are public
officials because they are paid with public funds but do not exercise extent of
government control at issue in New York Times, Rosenblatt); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Lipscomb, 362 S.E.2d 32, 37 (Va. 1987) (concluding public school teachers
are not public officials because public does not have independent interest in
teacher conduct amounting to more than its interest in all government
employees).
149. For further discussion of high school coaches as defamation plaintiffs,
see infra notes 151–227 and accompanying text.
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professional sport figures, are not adequately situated for or deserving of the actual malice burden.150
1. The New York Times Rule Does Not Apply: High School Coaches are
Private Individuals
It is no secret or surprise that the public or private status of
high school coaches is debated among courts of differing jurisdiction, but United States Supreme Court jurisprudence provides
enough insight to confidently conclude high school coaches are
not intended to be included within the public official distinction
and only under rare, unique circumstances would they be considered a public figure.151 In O’Connor v. Burningham, the Utah Supreme Court decided defamatory statements made towards a high
school basketball coach are not provided with the heightened protection attributed to the actual malice burden because high school
coaches are private individuals, not public officials.152 The
O’Connor decision marks one of the state courts that has correctly
utilized the United State Supreme Court’s concerns and reasoning
behind the actual malice burden when applying it to the position of
a public high school coach.153 In that case, the plaintiff was a women’s basketball coach in a small town whose coaching ability was
seemingly unquestioned and satisfactory.154 Unfortunately for the
plaintiff-coach, satisfaction with his coaching ability came to a
screeching halt when an elite basketball player joined the school
team in 2003.155 As the Utah Supreme Court stated, the elite basketball player “did not herald the beginning of a basketball dynasty
150. For further discussion of professional sport figures and collegiate
coaches as defamation plaintiffs, see infra notes 231–251 and accompanying text.
151. See O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1218–19 (Utah 2007) (providing overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence reasoning Court was concerned
with positions of power, of influence in government actions, but high school
coaches do not hold such positions so coaches are not within Court’s public official or public figure distinctions).
152. See id. at 1216 (concluding high school basketball coach is not public
official).
153. See id. at 1217–19 (engaging with Supreme Court precedent by applying
concerns, reasoning to position of high school coach).
154. See id. at 1216–17 (stating Plaintiff was employed as varsity coach in 2003
until dismissed prior to 2004–2005 school year after parents’ complaints were
made in November of 2003, continued until his dismissal).
155. See id. (noting complaints about Plaintiff’s coaching commenced after
elite basketball player joined team); see also Pioneers Make It Back-to-Back,
DESERTNEWS (Feb. 7, 2004), https://www.deseret.com/2004/2/7/19811031/pioneers-make-it-back-to-back [https://perma.cc/NS5X-4MEX] (discussing success of
elite player who led team coached by Plaintiff to win championship game).
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at the school,” but her talent compared to other players’ talent did
not “foster a desirable team chemistry.”156
After the elite player joined the team, parents and friends of
team players began a “persistent and multifaceted campaign of
complaints” including accusations that the coach wrongly recruited
a player from another school, improperly favored the elite player,
and misallocated the use of money for team expenses.157 The high
school administration took no action in response to the complaints
so the parents and friends took the complaints to the school board,
which similarly took no action against the coach in response to the
complaints.158 Nonetheless, the school administration ultimately
decided to terminate the coach’s position because the coach would
not promise to not refuse playing time to certain players in response to the complaints filed by the parents and friends.159 The
coach filed a defamation claim which was struck down by the lower
courts because it determined the coach was a public official and
failed to prove the complaints were made with actual malice.160
The O’Connor court began its analysis with a look into the actual malice requirement and its Supreme Court origins; namely, the
Court’s fear that First Amendment rights would be inadequate if
the public feared civil liability for criticizing and publishing opinions relating to individuals whose positions influence the outcome
of government decisions.161 Next, the O’Connor court looked to Rosenblatt and Butts because those cases were intended to further define the outer limits of the public official distinction.162 The court
156. See O’Connor, 165 P.3d at 1216 (describing team atmosphere during 2003
basketball season while noting team tension “spelled trouble” for coach).
157. See id. at 1216–17 (stating various complaints began in 2003, and continued until coach’s dismissal).
158. See id. at 1217 (describing course of action taken by parents and friends
along with responses received from school administration).
159. See id. (noting school board cited coach’s refusal not to retaliate against
players by refusing game time as reason for coach’s termination).
160. See id. (describing lower court’s reason for granting and affirming summary judgment for parents on basis of coach’s status as public official, because
Defendant was unable to meet standard of actual malice in order to prove
defamation).
161. See id. (analyzing New York Times, making note of Court’s concern with
defamation reaching too far as to be reminiscent of Sedition Act). For further
discussion of New York Times and its progeny, see supra notes 28–66 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s concern with First
Amendment rights and defamation suits filed by public officials, see infra notes
258–276 and accompanying text.
162. See O’Connor, 165 P.3d at 1218 (observing Rosenblatt, Butts attempted to
provide guidance to courts facing public official determination, but “comprehensive definition of public official continues to escape courts”).
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focused on Rosenblatt’s explanation of the New York Times rule in
which the Supreme Court concluded the public official distinction
applies when the public has an interest in the conduct exercised by
a plaintiff in a government position that extends further than the
public’s general interest in conduct of all government positions.163
Moreover, the court took special note of Butts’ refusal to apply the
public official distinction to the defamed University of Georgia athletic director in that case.164 Although the plaintiff in Butts was not
technically a government employee, the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that the interest in public education and athletics justified concluding the plaintiff was a public official because as an
athletic director, his position did not allow him to advance government policy and it was vastly unlike the position and considerations
in New York Times.165
The court reasoned that the public official distinction is reserved for matters of public policy and government employees
whose position assigns responsibilities that are likely to influence
public policy in civil areas, rather than cultural areas.166 Unquestionably, the government responsibility assigned to a high school
sport coach does not have the ability to influence civil concerns
such as life and liberty; namely, as the O’Connor court pointedly reasoned, “[t]he policies and actions of [a high school coach] does not
affect . . . the civic affairs of a community — the affairs most citizens
would understand to be the real work of government.”167
The O’Connor court took time to note that high school sports
are important within communities and in recent years the nation163. See id. (“The Court first attempted to fill the gap in [Rosenblatt] by providing functional guidance that a public official exists for the purposes of New York
Times ‘[w]here a position in government has such apparent importance that the
public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the
person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and
performance of all government employees.’ ” (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
75, 86 (1966))).
164. See id. (reasoning Supreme Court’s refusal to designate defamed plaintiff
in Butts as public official provides persuasive justification for concluding high
school basketball coach is not public official).
165. See id. at 1219 (stating Supreme Court did not view athletic director of
public university as position capable of vindicating government policy, nor was it
position analogous to New York Times).
166. See id. (interpreting Supreme Court jurisprudence as limiting public official distinction to individuals whose responsibilities influence public policy in areas
of civil concerns).
167. See id. (concluding governmental responsibility assigned to individual is
what guides public official inquiry, stating because coach’s conduct does not materially influence matters concerning life, liberty, or property, coaches are not public
officials).
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wide interest in high school athletics has greatly increased, but an
importance in popular culture does not elevate high school
coaches to the public official level because a coaching position provides no ability to implement policies that broadly influence public
policy within the educational sphere of our society.168 All in all, the
Utah Supreme Court concluded the plaintiff was a private individual not within the purview of the New York Times rule because this
role did not correlate with the Supreme Court’s concerns and reasons that provide the basis for applying heightened constitutional
protections to defamatory statements directed at individuals who
advance government policies or resolve public issues directly influencing the life, liberty, or property of American citizens.169
Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court also correctly applied Supreme Court jurisprudence to the public official inquiry of a high
school coach, though the set of facts presented are much more
complex than McGuire and O’Connor.170 In Verity v. USA Today,171
the plaintiff was employed as a teacher and the varsity women’s softball and basketball coach.172 In 2005, the plaintiff began an inappropriate relationship with a player he coached at the school.173
The school administration contacted police to conduct an investigation into the relationship, and when the investigation was complete
the plaintiff and school administration agreed the plaintiff would
168. See id. at 1220 (acknowledging coaches can significantly influence students, parents); see also id. (noting nationwide coverage of high school athletics has
greatly increased but increased popularity does not elevate coaches to public official standard). The O’Connor court acknowledged that many public officials do exist within public education as those public officials supervise the conduct of the
public education system and are responsible for policy implementation that directly influence the public education system—however, coaches have no such influence. See id. (“To be sure, many public officials populate the public education
arena. But these employees occupy supervisory and policy-making positions more
comprehensive than the role of a coach . . . when these educational officials assumed their duties, they likely surrendered no small portion of their ability to protect their reputations. Coaches . . . struck no such bargain.”).
169. See id. at 1219 (stating influence of coaches is not consistent with type of
influence or policy determinations implemented by government employees and
public figures described in New York Times, Butts).
170. See Verity v. USA Today, 436 P.3d 653, 659, 663 (Idaho 2019) (observing
defamation plaintiff had teaching license revoked after engaging in inappropriate
relationships with high school athletes he coached, concluding plaintiff was private
individual under New York Times).
171. Verity v. USA Today, 436 P.3d 653 (Idaho 2019).
172. See id. at 658–59 (stating Plaintiff was employed in Oregon as middle
school teacher, coaching two varsity women’s sport teams).
173. See id. at 659 (observing inappropriate relationship around spring 2005
between coach and eighteen-year-old team player, including thousands of latenight calls, sexually suggestive text messages).
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resign.174 The plaintiff’s Oregon teaching license was revoked and
his reapplication was denied.175
The plaintiff alleged that numerous defendants, some of which
included USA Today, an Oregon news station, and an Idaho news
station, defamed him after reporting on the concerning details surrounding the plaintiff’s conduct in Oregon and the subsequent
teaching licensure in Idaho.176 After those reports were released,
concerned citizens began reaching out to the Idaho school district
that employed the plaintiff following his resignation in Oregon,
leading to his resignation from that school district as well in
2016.177 The plaintiff filed his defamation complaint one month
after his resignation and the complaint also alleged that he was removed from multiple coaching positions, including his son’s youth
baseball team, after the reports were released.178 The district court
concluded the plaintiff was not a public official, and the defendants
filed a motion to appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court seeking
review of whether the plaintiff, as a public school teacher and
coach, was a public official.179
Naturally, the Idaho Supreme Court’s analysis began with a
look at New York Times and its implications.180 Using fairly similar
reasoning to the O’Connor court, the Verity court concluded a public
official voluntarily holds a position that is active in the “rough-and174. See id. (observing resignation settlement agreement between Plaintiff,
school administration occurred approximately two months after police investigation began).
175. See id. (noting Oregon commission revoked Plaintiff’s teaching license
and denied reinstatement one year later because psychologist concluded upon
evaluation plaintiff “should not be left alone with any female student over the age
of [twelve] . . . .”).
176. See id. at 659–60 (noting Oregon news station reported on how schools
track teacher discipline, including Plaintiff’s conduct, subsequent move, as illustration of failure to discipline or protect children); see also id. at 660 (noting Idaho
news station reported age of student whom Plaintiff had inappropriate relationship with, reported on Idaho superintendent’s knowledge of Plaintiff’s past teaching conduct).
177. See id. at 661 (acknowledging email communications ensued after media
reports, while noting plaintiff resigned from teaching position in February 2016).
178. See id. (“On February 22, 2016, Verity resigned his position . . . with Vallivue School District. Verity also alleges that he was no longer allowed to coach his
son’s youth baseball league and was rejected from other coaching positions after
the articles were published.”); see also id. (noting Plaintiff, joined by his wife, sued
Defendants on March 28, 2016, including one claim alleging Defendants defamed
Plaintiff).
179. See id. at 661–62 (describing procedural history, question of law
presented to Idaho Supreme Court on appeal).
180. See id. at 663 (noting status as public figure or public official under New
York Times, Gertz, Rosenblatt is important determination because it determines level
of proof necessary for successful defamation claim).
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tumble” arena of public debate, thereby rendering those public officials less entitled to the level of reputational legal protection available to private individuals.181 Adding a bit more clarity to that
“rough-and-tumble” description, the court explained the actual
malice burden applies to public officials who hold positions that
afford the individual “substantial responsibility for or control over
the conduct of governmental affairs” and public official status is
based on the principles set forth in New York Times along with the
conflict between the public’s interest in debating public issues involving public figures and society’s interest in protecting
reputation.182
In its analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court focused largely on the
plaintiff’s position of public school teacher, but the considerations
were analogous to his as youth sports coach.183 According to the
court, while a public teacher is employed by the government and
the public has a broad interest in certain conduct the teacher engages in, that is not enough to render the teacher a public official
because teachers do not hold a substantial level of government authority comparable to the substantial authority rendered to actual
public officials.184
Crucial for high school coaches nationwide is the Verity court’s
emphasis on the plaintiff’s lack of influence and persuasive
power.185 It noted that a high school coach has the same limited
181. See id. (describing view of public officials in arena of defamation law).
182. See id. (explaining actual malice burden is applicable when individuals
hold certain substantial government positions); see also id. (stating public official
status must be determined in consideration of New York Times holding plus Supreme Court’s later explanations of justifications behind applying heightened burden to public officials).
183. See id. (concluding public teachers will rarely be considered public officials while stating Plaintiff’s coaching position, teaching position, were not positions of such societal influence as to warrant public official status).
184. See id. (acknowledging Plaintiff was government employee but concluding Plaintiff did not attempt to control public policy, was not given capacity to
exercise authority given to public officials, thus concluding plaintiff was private
individual); see also id. (rejecting defendants’ argument asserting public importance of teaching positions coupled with concerning allegations set forth by media
reports were sufficient to render Plaintiff public official).
185. See id. (stating Plaintiff did not enjoy position of “persuasive power and
influence” by means of teaching position or coaching position). For state courts
considering the status of high school coaches, it is helpful to take note of the Verity
court’s emphasis on the ability of public officials and public figures to defend reputation through media outlets, while private individuals do not hold such influence, because it is a key point that has been emphasized by the Supreme Court on
numerous occasions. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (concluding
actual malice burden applied to public officials does not minimize importance of
defamation liability because “[s]ociety has a pervasive and strong interest in
preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation”); see also Gertz v. Robert
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access to self-help options as private individuals when it comes to
self-help avenues for finding relief from defamatory statements resulting in reputational harm.186 Conversely, public officials and
public figures hold “persuasive power and influence” and “enjoy
significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false
statements than private individuals normally enjoy,” which is notably distinct from the access to self-help avenues a typical high
school coach has.187 Applying the guiding language of Supreme
Court precedent, the Verity court presented a clear and concise reasoning for why the plaintiff was not a public official or public figure,
despite the egregious conduct at issue.188
Nonetheless, it should be noted that it would be a stretch to
conclude every high school coach under any circumstances is a private individual for the purpose of defamation.189 The Supreme
Court of Ohio in Milkovich v. News-Herald190 concluded an awardwinning high school basketball coach was not a public figure or a
public official. 191 Milkovich was subsequently overturned; however,
the inquiry announced in overturning Milkovich suggested high
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (“The first remedy of any victim of defamation is self-help—using available opportunities to contradict the lie . . . and thereby
to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. Public officials and public figures
usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements
. . . . Private individuals are therefore more vulnerable to injury, and the state
interest in protecting them is correspondingly greater.”).
186. See Verity, 436 P.3d at 663–64 (stating as high school coach, Plaintiff
lacked means or influence to defend against allegations published in national
news outlet such as USA Today, illustrating why Plaintiff better classified as private
individual).
187. See id. (noting public figures, unlike high school coaches, have “persuasive power and influence” including greater access to platforms to defend reputation (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342, 344–45)).
188. See id. at 664 (concluding high school coach was not public official because coach did not hold “influential role in ordering society” nor did coach act in
same capacity as public official (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345)); see also id. at
663–64 (concluding high school coach was not public figure because he did not
achieve fame or notoriety that would render him all-purpose public figure, or
thrust himself into public controversy attempting to influence resolution).
189. See Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Ohio 1986) (stating high
school wrestling coach was public official because coach led substantial responsibilities as school superintendent). For further discussion of Scott and the court’s analysis, see infra notes 202–209 and accompanying text.
190. Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio 1984), overruled by Scott
v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986).
191. See id. at 1194–95 (holding plaintiff was not public official or figure because of coaching or teaching positions held).
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school coaches would still be considered private individuals.192
Thus, a brief look into the facts of Milkovich are warranted. The
plaintiff was a high school wrestling coach and teacher, but his
coaching and teaching career took a massive hit after a fight between fans and wrestlers broke out.193 The defendant, a sports
writer, wrote an article alleging the plaintiff and school superintendent lied under oath at a judicial proceeding.194 The plaintiff filed
a defamation action and the trial court determined he was a public
figure and failed to prove the defendants acted with actual
malice.195
The Supreme Court of Ohio disagreed, beginning its explanation with an overview of the actual malice burden.196 The court’s
refusal to classify the plaintiff as a public figure or official was
largely based on Gertz; reasoning the plaintiff would be a public official or figure “if Rosenbloom and Butts were the last statements made
by the high court concerning the definition of a public figure or
official.”197 Applying its reasoning to the facts of the case, the court
concluded the plaintiff was not a public figure because although he
was an award-winning wrestling coach, those achievements and his
coaching position did not give him “persuasive power and influence.”198 Similarly, his coaching position did not “put him at the
forefront of public controversies,” and while plaintiff was involved
in a public controversy after the fight at the wrestling meet oc192. See McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 827 n.4 (Minn. 2019) (stating
newly announced test overruling Milkovich suggests high school coaches would not
be considered public officials or figures).
193. See Milkovich, 473 N.E.2d at 1191–92 (explaining plaintiff’s coaching position, teaching position, unfolding of events leading to defamation action).
194. See id. (describing allegations contained in Defendant’s article, including
statements such as “The teachers responsible were mainly head Maple wrestling
coach, Mike Milkovich [plaintiff], and former superintendent of schools, H. Donald Scott . . . . Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights,
Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at
the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.” As noted,
the article accused the plaintiff and former superintendent, H. Donald Scott, of
lying under oath—these accusations are also the basis of Scott which overruled the
court’s holding in Milkovich. See Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 701 (noting coach and superintendent defamation actions were tried separately but rendered similar
outcomes).
195. See Milkovich, 473 N.E.2d at 1193 (stating procedural history of defamation claim at issue).
196. See id. at 1193–94 (providing summary of Supreme Court defamation
jurisprudence).
197. See id. at 1194 (reasoning Gertz suggests Plaintiff was not within group of
individuals Supreme Court intended to classify as public officials or figures).
198. See id. at 1195 (noting Plaintiff’s accomplishments in coaching before
stating such achievements do not elevate Plaintiff to public figure status).
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curred, he did not “thrust himself to the forefront of that controversy in order to influence its decision.”199
Specifically, the court highlighted Rosenblatt’s conclusion that
the “public official designation applies at the very least to those
among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control
over the conduct of governmental affairs.”200 Thus, the Milkovich
court concluded the plaintiff-coach was a private individual; however, the superintendent also at the center of the alleged defamatory news article did not receive such a classification, for reasons
similar to those explored in courts that did find a public official
status to apply to similarly situated defamation plaintiffs to
McGuire.201
2. The New York Times Rule Does Apply: High School Coaches Are Not
Private Individuals
High school coaches pursuing a defamation claim should be
mindful of where the claim is filed because the same reasons behind not classifying coaches as public officials are often used decide
that coaches are public officials.202 Overruling Milkovich, the Supreme Court of Ohio announced Scott v. News-Herald, 203 which
199. See id. (providing justifications for rejecting argument Plaintiff was public
figure in light of Gertz).
200. See id. at 1195 (rejecting argument Plaintiff was public official based on
Rosenblatt) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
201. See id. (concluding plaintiff coach was not public official or figure under
Supreme Court jurisdiction). But see Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 701
(Ohio 1986) (concluding plaintiff superintendent was public official because superintendent had substantial responsibilities for entire school system). It is important to note that the Supreme Court denied Certiorari to hear Milkovich, but in
dissent Justice Brennan starkly criticized the Ohio Supreme Court’s refusal to classify the Milkovich plaintiff as a public figure. See Lorain J. Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S.
953, 964 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A large fight between the students of
two rival schools quite legitimately raises serious concerns for the entire community, particularly when, as here, it results in injury to students. The present controversy centered primarily around the conduct of one man—Milkovich—in
encouraging the fight; that conduct allegedly resulted in an OHSAA hearing, his
censure by that association, and the disqualification of his team from eligibility in
the state wrestling tournament. To say that Milkovich nevertheless was not a public
figure for purposes of discussion about the controversy is simply nonsense.” (internal footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 964 n.10 (distinguishing plaintiff in Milkovich
on grounds that Plaintiff, as opposed to Defendant reporter, created public controversy at issue thereby justifying classifying plaintiff as public figure).
202. See O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Utah 2007) (concluding high school coaches do not perform material work of government actors
under New York Times rule). But see Johnston v. Corinthian Television Co., 583
P.2d 1101, 1103 (Okla. 1978) (stating work of high school coach is “obvious government function”).
203. 496 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1986).
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serves as an illustration of how the intertwined nature of teaching
and coaching positions can provide the basis for concluding high
school coaches are public officials.204 Scott arose out of the same
incident giving rise to Milkovich, but the key difference is the plaintiff in Milkovich was a wrestling coach and teacher while the plaintiff
in Scott was the school superintendent.205
Scott does not definitively decide that all high school coaches
will be considered public officials; however, the court’s analysis
shows the usual basis on which courts hold that a high school
coach, that by acting as a teaching figure or holding an actual
teaching position, are public officials for the purpose of defamation
claims arising out of coaching conduct.206 At the outset, it is hard
to disagree with the Scott court’s conclusion that a superintendent is
a public official because he had substantial responsibilities as the
head of an entire school district, and the public has a substantial
interest in the conduct of an individual yielding so much power
over public schools.207 However, the court’s comparison between
the coach in Milkovich and the superintendent in Scott is less convincing, because of the differences in roles of a teacher versus those
of a superintendent.208 Nonetheless, the more courts compare a
204. See Milkovich, 474 U.S. at 960 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing high
school wrestling coach is public official based on teaching position). Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall dissented to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari;
however, the dissent conducted its inquiry based on the wrestling coach’s teaching
position, despite the incident at issue arising out of the coach’s actions at a wrestling match. See id. (noting incident at high school wrestling match led to publication of allegedly defamatory publication, but publication challenged coach’s
qualifications to teach “in light of” conduct at wrestling match).
205. See Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 700 (noting plaintiffs’ positions in Scott, in
Milkovich).
206. See McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.29 819, 827 n.4 (Minn. 2019) (arguing
test announced in Scott suggests Ohio Supreme Court would not classify high
school coach as public official); see also Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 703–04 (noting Justice
Brennan’s dissent, concluding teacher acting as coach, as superintendent are public officials because both perform “a task that goes to the heart of representative
government” (quoting Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 958 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting))). The Scott decision goes beyond the public official determination, concluding the superintendent-plaintiff in Scott and the teacher and
head coach in Milkovich were public figures as well. See Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 704
(agreeing with Justice Brennan’s dissent, concluding fight at high school wrestling
match “raises serious concerns for the entire community, particularly when, as
here, it results in injury to students,” so teacher acting as coach was public figure
based on controversy at issue while superintendent was public figure based on his
responsibility for coach’s conduct).
207. See Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 702–03 (concluding Rosenblatt supports finding
superintendent to be public official).
208. See id. at 703–04 (stating both plaintiffs were “authority figures” with
“substantial impact on . . . community” while recognizing both roles satisfy public
figure, public official inquiries).
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coach’s role to the role of a teacher, the more likely it is the court
will reason the coach is a public official because as a teacher, the
coach performs a task of great concern to the government and
citizens.209
Unlike Scott, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp.210 did not explicitly blur the line between the
titles of coach and teacher; rather, it justified classifying a coach as a
public official by comparing the similarities between the roles of
teacher and coach.211 The plaintiff in Johnston, like many other
coaches, was a teacher who also coached the middle school wrestling team.212 The plaintiff filed the defamation claim against a television broadcaster after the corporation broadcasted a news story
alleging the plaintiff abused and humiliated a sixth grade student
who wanted to rejoin the team coached by the plaintiff.213
First, the Johnston court reasoned a person is properly considered a public official if, like in New York Times, the person is an
elected official, and the alleged defamatory material relates to the
person’s official conduct.214 Alternatively, the court reasoned a
person is properly considered a public official under Rosenblatt.215
Applying Rosenblatt guidelines, the court held the plaintiff’s coaching position was of “apparent importance” in the school’s athletics
for “the public to have an independent interest” in the plaintiff’s
conduct as coach.216 According to the Johnston court, the fact that
numerous parents had withdrawn their children from the plaintiff’s
physical education class illustrated why the public’s interest went
209. See Lorain J. Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 958 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (indicating teachers perform tasks at core of government concerns); see
also Markovitz, supra note 26, at 1966 (arguing classifying teacher as public official
because teachers have duties that may impact citizens lives or property is antithetical to Supreme Court legal precedent).
210. Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978).
211. See id. at 1104 (reasoning coach works in public school system, so conduct of teachers, coaches, both concern public as much as other obvious public
official roles); see also Scott, 496 N.E.2d at 703–04 (referring to plaintiff only in
terms of role as teacher, concluding teachers are public officials).
212. See Johnston, 583 P.2d at 1102 (noting plaintiff coached grade school
wrestling team while teaching physical education).
213. See id. (describing allegations contained in broadcast).
214. See id. at 1102–03 (noting one way in which individual is deemed public
official under New York Times Co.).
215. See id. (noting second way in which individual is deemed public official
under Rosenblatt).
216. See id. at 1103 (concluding coaching position satisfied Rosenblatt guidelines); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85–86 (1966) (implying to be properly deemed public official, plaintiffs must at least have control or responsibility
over government policy through position public holds heightened interest in).
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beyond a general interest in all government positions.217 However,
that reasoning is inconsistent with Rosenblatt because the court was
analyzing the “apparent importance” of a public school coach, not
the position of teacher; therefore, the Johnston court justified its
“apparent importance” finding by relying on the wrong position because the alleged defamatory remarks related to the plaintiff as a
coach, not as a teacher.218
Furthermore, the Johnston analysis is flawed in another way; it
reads the Rosenblatt guidelines as providing two distinct ways an individual may be deemed a public official.219 The court concluded
the plaintiff’s position satisfied Rosenblatt’s second guideline, but it
did not conclude the position satisfied the first guideline which instructs courts that an individual may be deemed a public official if
the position is one that has “substantial responsibility” for government affairs.220 At best, the Johnston court briefly noted the plaintiff’s substantial responsibility for government affairs by relying on
an Illinois Appellate Court decision that concluded teachers and
coaches were public officials because they held “highly responsible
[public] positions” and public school systems, including athletics,
are “consistent subjects of intense public interest.”221
Finally, another concern with the Johnston decision is its statement that “the conduct of a coach-teacher and [the plaintiff’s
coaching and teaching] policies were as much as a concern to the
community as any other public official.”222 First, it needlessly ex217. See Johnston, 583 P.2d at 1103 (describing public’s interest in coaching
position).
218. See O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1219 (Utah 2007) (“The
‘apparent importance’ of a position in government sufficient to propel a government employee into a public official status has nothing to do with the breadth or
depth of the passion . . . that the government official might ignite in a segment of
the public. Nor is celebrity, for good or ill, of the government employee particularly relevant. Rather, it is the nature of the governmental responsibility that
guides our public official inquiry.”). But see McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819,
826 (Minn. 2019) (stating Rosenblatt requires public official inquiry to focus on
plaintiff’s role as coach, not plaintiff’s conduct).
219. See Johnston, 583 P.2d at 1103 (noting Rosenblatt provided two distinct
guidelines to aid in defining public official before concluding Plaintiff satisfied
second guideline).
220. See id. (noting Rosenblatt guidelines, then applying “the second standard”
to plaintiff’s position as coach).
221. See id. (“Plaintiffs are public employees . . . . As coaches and teachers in a
local high school they maintain highly responsible positions in the community . . . .
Public school systems, their athletic programs, and those who run them are consistent subjects of intense public interest and substantial publicity.” (quoting Basarich
v. Rodeghero, 321 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974))).
222. See id. (gauging public’s apparent interest in Plaintiff’s position as coach,
as teacher).
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pands the inquiry to consider the position and conduct of the plaintiff as a teacher.223 Second, stating the plaintiff’s conduct was as
much of a concern as “any other public official” suggests the public’s interest did not satisfy Rosenblatt’s guideline requiring the interest to be more than a general public interest in the qualifications of
all government employees.224 Relying on the importance of the
public school system as a whole to conclude the plaintiff’s coaching
position is of “apparent importance” to the public appears inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s refusal to extend the public official
classification to include low-ranking government employees.225 Additionally, that reasoning is almost identical to a line of reasoning
the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected because it was inconsistent
with Rosenblatt.226 Thus, the Johnston court did not hold back from
stating the position at issue was one of a coach, but it failed to explain how the public official inquiry would be satisfied if, as McGuire
and Rosenblatt instruct, the inquiry was limited to considering only
223. See id. (refusing to limit public official inquiry to position of coach). The
Johnston court was seemingly aware of the problem with blurring the line between
the distinct positions the plaintiff held in the school system; thus, it justified the
blur by concluding the public school system itself and the plaintiff’s coaching position within that system satisfied the public official inquiry. See id. (“[W]e can think
of no higher community involvement touching more families and carrying more
public interest than the public school system. This includes the athletic
program.”).
224. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (stating individual is public
official when position generates “apparent importance” beyond public’s general
interest in conduct of all government employees).
225. See id. at 87 n.13 (“It is suggested that this [apparent importance] test
might apply to a night watchman accused of stealing state secrets . . . . The employee’s position must be one which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of
the person holding it, entirely apart from the . . . particular charges in controversy.”). Consider a hypothetical volunteer high school basketball coach—the Supreme Court was clear that a night watchman accused of stealing state secrets
would not be a public official; thus, a volunteer high school basketball coach accused of stealing confidential public school records would not be a public official.
See id. (stating position, independent of any particular controversy or defamatory
remark, must be of apparent importance to public for actual malice to apply).
However, applying the Johnston reasoning, the volunteer coach could be deemed a
public official because the volunteer coach functions within the school system and
is responsible for disciplining and instructing students. See Johnston, 583 P.2d at
1103 (reasoning coaching position was of apparent importance because school system is government function, public has independent interest in coach disciplining
student, public has exceedingly higher interest in school system than any other
“community involvement”).
226. Compare McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. 2019) (declaring coaching position must be of apparent importance to support public official
determination because Rosenblatt stated public official designation “does not depend on the particulars of a person’s conduct”), with Johnston, 583 P.2d at 1103
(failing to explain how coaching position was of apparent importance to public
independent of coach’s general disciplinary conduct in school system as teacher,
as coach).
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the plaintiff’s position as coach and the public’s interest in his
coaching position absent any particulars of the dispute giving rise
to the filing of the defamation suit.227
Specifically, because Supreme Court precedent requires courts
to balance the public’s interest free debate against society’s interest
in protecting reputation, the McGuire court logically concluded that
to appropriately strike that balance, the public official distinction
should only apply to positions with duties relating to the core function of the government.228 Nonetheless, even if courts conclude
coaches do not occupy positions relating to the core function of
government, it is important for high school coaches to consider the
unlikely, but possible conclusion, that they are public figures within
the purview of the New York Times rule and bear the burden of proving actual malice.229 A brief look at defamation claims filed by college coaches and professional athletes show why it is hard to
imagine a high school coach, in a similar position as the coach in
McGuire, being considered a public figure.230

227. See Johnston, 583 P.2d at 1103 (applying public official inquiry to coaching position but relying on coaching position, teaching position, student withdrawals from classroom instruction, general school system presence to conclude
plaintiff was public official). For further discussion of how Johnston is inconsistent
with Supreme Court precedent and why McGuire applied the appropriate public
official inquiry for high school coach plaintiff, see infra notes 277–292 and accompanying text.
228. See Johnston, 583 P.2d at 1103 (“To strike this balance, we conclude that
. . . to support the conclusion that someone is a public official, his or her duties
must relate to the core functions of government, such as safety and public order.
Although McGuire was employed by the school district, his coaching duties are
ancillary to core functions of government; put simply, basketball is not fundamental to democracy.”). This conclusion is especially logical in light of the government positions at issue in New York Times and Rosenblatt. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (concluding Commissioner was public official
position requiring Commissioner to prove actual malice to succeed in defamation
claim); see also Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87 (concluding Plaintiff employed by county
responsible for maintenance of public ski resort was public official because Plaintiff stated at trial his role was important, plus public viewed Plaintiff as head of
resort); id. at 87–88 (noting evidence could have supported finding Plaintiff was
outside public official distinction; thus, concluding Plaintiff should have opportunity to make such argument on retrial).
229. See Lewis, supra note 20, at 790–92 (noting sport officials are not public
officials under New York Times, but may still bear burden of New York Times Rule if
classified as public figure).
230. For further discussion of defamation claims filed by university coaches
and professional athletes, see infra notes 231–251 and accompanying text.
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3. The New York Times Rule Might Apply: Does Defamation Law View
High School Coaches, Collegiate Coaches and Professional
Athletes Similarly?
Although the public or private status of a high school coach in
a defamation action is not frequently presented to courts, nearly
thirty years before Verity and McGuire, the District of Columbia went
beyond the bounds of local high school athletics and concluded a
public university professor and women’s basketball coach was not a
public official or public figure.231 In that case, Moss v. Stockard,232
the women’s basketball coach at the University of Washington D.C.
was fired by the University Athletic Director after it was alleged the
coach had misappropriated team funds.233 The coach sued for defamation and on appeal, one of the many issues turned on whether
she was a public official or public figure thereby faced with showing
the misappropriation statements were made with actual malice.234
Applying a three-part test, the court concluded the coach was not a
public figure.235 The court also noted that it seemed doubtful that
a public controversy surrounding the coach’s termination even existed, thereby implying the first element of the inquiry was also not
satisfied.236 Moreover, the court rejected the argument that the
coach was a limited-purpose public figure based on her position
within the women’s basketball community because there was no
231. See Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1033 (D.C. 1990) (holding public
university coach who was also professor was private figure in defamation action).
232. Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011 (D.C. 1990).
233. See id. at 1014–16 (describing details of misappropriation allegation
while noting athletic director informed numerous individuals reason for firing
coach was misappropriation of funds).
234. See id. at 1029 (noting public or private status of university coach was at
issue on appeal).
235. See id. at 1030–31 (adopting three-part test looking to whether public
controversy exited, whether defamation plaintiff attempted to influence outcome
of such public contresy, whether defamatory statements at issue related to such
public controversy).
236. See id. at 1031–32 (noting news of coach’s termination spread through
university community including local news outlets, but such controversy was unlike
large scale public controversies at issue in other defamation actions involving public figure plaintiffs which “stretch[ed] matters considerably” to conclude public
controversy existed considering facts presented). The Stockard reasoning strongly
suggests the court did not believe the first element of the public figure inquiry was
met, but it declined to make its conclusion on that basis because the second element was clearly not met. See id. at 1032 (“We thus have considerable doubt
whether Stockard’s firing meets the standard of ‘public controversy’ necessary to
satisfy the first [public figure inquiry] criterion. We need not resolve that issue
finally, however, because it is apparent that the second requirement of [the public
figure inquiry] is not fulfilled.”).
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connection between the dispute over team funds and her role
within the basketball community.237
The Stockard court contrasted Stockard’s position with other
popular sport figures who have gained so much notoriety that they
are considered general public figures regardless of any connection
between the dispute and relative role in community.238 Finally, the
court correctly illustrated one of the most imperative aspects of defamation actions involving coaches and the actual malice burden in
stating “[m]erely by achieving some success as a basketball coach,
[Stockard] did not expose herself to a greater risk of being falsely
accused of financial defalcation in her duties than any other person.”239 Considering a coaching position at a public university was
insufficient to establish a heightened burden under both the public
official inquiry and the public figure inquiry, it seems those inquiries applied to a high school coach should result in the same
conclusion.240
The Stockard court’s comparison between the coaching position in that case and a professional athlete’s position is illustrative
because there is almost no debate among courts that entertainers
and professional athletes are public figures because those profes237. See id. at 1032–33 (stating coach was not limited-purpose public figure on
basis of role in women’s basketball community).
238. See id. at 1033 (stating Stockard’s position was “markedly different” from
sports figures considered general public figures). Informatively, the Stockard court
highlighted the difference in prominence among sport figures in footnote thirtyeight; first looking at the plaintiff athletic director in Butts. See id. at 1033 n.38
(“University of Georgia athletic director Wally Butts ‘commanded a substantial
amount of independent public interest at the time of publication,’ and attained
public figure status ‘by position alone’ ” (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130, 154–55 (1967) (plurality opinion))). Next, the court contrasted Stockard’s position as university coach to a professional football player deemed to be a
general-purpose public figure. See id. (noting participation in professional football
league draws player into national limelight sufficient to render player general public figure).
239. See id. at 1033 (concluding unlike other limited-purpose public figures,
Stockard did not use coaching position to influence debate surrounding her termination, so her success in coaching position was insufficient to conclude she was not
private citizen for defamation purposes).
240. See id. (concluding termination of university basketball coach did not
trigger heightened constitutional protection). Specifically, the Stockard court explained the University’s desire to discuss the coach’s termination was limited to
only a small audience, a similar point made by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
McGuire. See id. (“In summary, the perceived need by [the university] to communicate to a limited audience within the university—the players and coaches—the
reason for Stockard’s discharge implicates no public interest of constitutional dimension. It therefore does not warrant subordinating society’s interest in affording
relief for reputational injury that results from defamatory falsehood.”). For further discussion of McGuire, see supra notes 74–139 and accompanying text.
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sions naturally draw vast amounts of media and public attention.241
Former professional football player, Don Chuy, filed a defamation
claim alleging the Philadelphia Eagles were liable to him for defamation after the team physician told a reporter that Chuy was retiring from the team prematurely due to a medical condition.242 The
reasoning in Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club243 is helpful in
understanding why high school coaches should be considered private individuals in two ways: it shows the limited nature of the public figure classification and it shows how defamation plaintiffs,
regardless of private or public status, must satisfy additional elements of defamation that serve the purpose of protecting potential
defendants from unjustified liability.244
Courts disagree in applying the public figure doctrine; nonetheless, the public figure distinction is unlikely to reach high school
coaches.245 In Chuy, the court reasoned that the article at issue addressed various aspects of the plaintiff’s athletic career and, generally, professional athletes’ careers generate widespread interest;
therefore, athletes enjoy public prominence as it relates to their
professional careers.246 The interest in Chuy’s career existed
before the article was published so his prominence in the public
sphere did not arise out of the publication and the article directly
related to his career; thus, Chuy was deemed a limited purpose public figure.247 The widespread interest associated with professional
241. See WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 9.3 (2020)
(stating courts conclude entertainers or professional athletes are public figures
due to line of work).
242. See Chuy v. Phila. Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1269–70 (3d Cir.
1979) (describing medical condition and basis of defamation claim).
243. 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
244. See John G. Long, High Standards for High School Athletes: Defamation Law
and Tomorrow’s Stars, 16 SPORTS L.J. 255, 270–71 (2009) (noting Chuy plaintiff’s
claim failed because he failed to show defamatory remarks hurt reputation); see
also Walker, supra note 70, at 972 (stating “passive involvement” insufficient to
deem plaintiff public figure).
245. See Long, supra note 244 at 272–76 (stating elite high school athletes
unlikely to be deemed public figures unless athletes “voluntarily injected” themselves into controversy at issue if controversy was ongoing before defamatory remarks were made); see also Walker, supra note 70, at 969 (noting court
disagreement applying public figure doctrine).
246. See Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1280 (reasoning professional athletes, “at least as to
their playing careers,” are in publicly prominent positions because athletes’ careers attract sport fan attention). The Chuy court concluded the article concerned
the source of Chuy’s public prominence, his football career, because it discussed
his retirement, team contract, and medical condition that impaired his ability to
play football. See id. at 1280 n.21 (stating matters surrounding professional athlete
careers, including contractual matters, attract attention of widespread audience).
247. See id. at 1280 (concluding article concerned plaintiff as public figure “in
respect to his ability to play football”); see also Long, supra note 244, at 270–71
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sports careers is vastly greater than the interest in the careers of
high school coaches; high school coaches attract the attention of
local fans, but that is far from being widespread.248
The Chuy decision has been criticized for its peculiar application of the public figure doctrine, but ultimately the public figure
determination had no bearing on the court’s holding because the
plaintiff’s claim failed on other grounds entirely unrelated to public or private status.249 Without applying the New York Times rule,
the court reasoned Chuy failed to show the statements regarding
his physical condition harmed his reputation; therefore, his defamation claim could not succeed.250 Actual malice is not the only
safeguard to protecting defamation defendants.251
B. Legal Fouls in the Courtroom and Fouls on the Court:
Applying The New York Times Rule to High School
Coaches is a Foul
For most high school coaches who find themselves as plaintiffs
in defamation actions, the actual malice burden has the potential to
restrict their chances of success through both the public official
and public figure determination.252 In one sense, the actual malice
burden is serving its purpose by making the chances of a successful
claim less likely, but in another sense it is in direct conflict with its
purpose because coaches are not the within the class of influential
plaintiffs the New York Times rule is intended to restrict.253 Moreo(noting Chuy court language deemed plaintiff limited purpose public figure as opposed to general purpose public figure).
248. See Long, supra note 244, at 275 (arguing interest in high school athletics
is growing but high school athletes will be public figures if they achieve special
prominence by virtue of athletic career).
249. See Chuy, 595 F.2d at 1281 (stating actual malice burden is irrelevant because Plaintiff failed to prove defamation regardless of heightened burden).
250. See id. at 1281–82 (“We perceive absolutely nothing in the statements . . .
which can be construed as defamatory . . . . For example, a malignancy suffered by
the wife of the President of the United States . . . or by a movie star is front page
public news. No one today treats such a communication as damaging to the esteem
or reputation of the unfortunate victim in the community.”).
251. See id. at 1281 (noting whether communication is capable of defamatory
meaning is question of law); see also McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 829
(Minn. 2019) (noting three defendants were granted summary judgment by district court because statements were subject to qualified privilege).
252. For discussion of high school coaches who have faced the public official
and public figure heightened burden in defamation actions, see supra notes
151–227 and accompanying text.
253. See O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1220 (Utah 2007) (stating
high school coaches do not hold positions of civic influence, so they do not forfeit
ability to protect reputation by holding public coaching position having little civic
influence); see also Long, supra note 244, at 276 (arguing public individual status is
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ver, high school athletics suffer when coaches are subject to campaigns of false, harsh criticisms in response to reasonable coaching
decisions.254
Defamation law is able to provide a remedy to coaches who
have suffered reputational harm and it encourages parents and
others to refrain from crossing the line between fair criticism and
false, reputationally harmful statements.255 The remedial and deterrent effect of defamation law encourages parents and coaches to
engage in criticism in a civil manner, it also allows athletes to be
coached in a manner the coach, not a parent or fan, feels is best for
the player’s skill.256 However, if coaches are deemed public individuals, the remedial and deterrent benefits of defamation law will be
almost impossible to achieve; thus, it is crucial for courts to deeply
consider the legal principles behind the actual malice burden and
the experience and interests high school coaches have when deciding a defamation claim.257
“detrimental” to defamation claim since deeming prominent high school athlete’s
to be public figures would be “nothing less than shocking”).
254. See Amy Donaldson, Ex-Lehi Coach Sues Parents, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 16,
2004, 9:02 AM), https://www.deseret.com/2004/9/16/19850840/ex-lehi-coachsues-parents [https://perma.cc/6TBZ-EZ4Y] (quoting O’Connor plaintiff-coach,
stating “I felt I had to stand up not just for myself but for other coaches who have
had to deal with similar situations. The right thing needs to be done. Coaches
everywhere want to be able to do the things they need to [sic] teach and to coach.
That’s really all we want to do. We love athletics. We love kids.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also Jeff DiVeronica, Angry Parents Cost This Honeoye Coach His
Job and Reputation so He Sued Them and Won $50K, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (May 23,
2018), https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/sports/high-school/2018/
05/18/high-school-basketball-coach-mark-storm-defamation-lawsuit-parentshoneoye-athletes-helicopter/543634002/ [https://perma.cc/RX3B-EH9C] (quoting former player in support of coach stating “[t]here were many times my mother
wanted to call him and ask him why he was so hard on me. But she trusted him as a
coach, and in the end I am thankful for every pro sprint, for every drop of sweat,
for every time I was held accountable because it is solely the reason I am successful
today”).
255. See Bob Cook, Criticize Youth Coaches If You Must—But Stick to the Facts,
Parents, or You’ll Get Sued, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bobcook/2019/09/16/criticize-youth-coaches-if-you-must-but-stick-to-the-facts-parents-or-youll-get-sued/?sh=2418efc92a44 [https://perma.cc/Z6LPUBKM](discussing defamation actions filed by high school coaches, drawing attention to difference between raising justified concerns versus “launching a smear
campaign”).
256. See Lee E. Green, Legal Br., Coaches Suing Parents of Athletes, SCH. SUPERINTENDENTS ASS’N (Nov. 2014), https://aasa.org/content.aspx?id=35418 [https://
perma.cc/Y8R3-4586] (suggesting school administrators create policies encouraging coaches to share information about parent conduct for schools to prevent possible defamation litigation).
257. See Long, supra note 244, at 276–77 (noting legal considerations in public status determination while noting substantial burden public status places on
defamed plaintiff leaves plaintiff open to increased reputational harm).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

45

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7

466

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 421

1. Supreme Court Precedent Does Not Support Deeming High School
Coaches Public Individuals
A fundamental point in defamation law is that Supreme Court
jurisprudence does not support determining an individual to be a
public official merely because the individual is employed by the
government—there must be a stronger connection between the individual’s government position and the public’s interest in debating
the administration of government affairs and individuals who substantially influence the resolution of public debate.258 Similarly, Supreme Court jurisprudence makes clear that involuntary public
figures are rare; all-purpose public figures are “celebrities,” enjoying general fame and prominence in the public eye, while limited-purpose public figures are well-known in a public controversy
and are public figures only regarding issues involved in that controversy.259 Whether an individual be a public official or a public figure, it is clear the Court viewed these classes as deserving of a
heightened burden because they are able to influence public debate and resolutions of public controversies either because of their
fame or official duties and, for the same reasons, those individuals
are better able to redress reputational harm without judicial
intervention.260
In fact, even though New York Times did not establish how far
the public official determination stretched, a simple look into the
precedent cited in support of the New York Times rule shows that the
public official determination was not intended to stretch to public
258. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 n.23 (1964) (declining
to determine which ranks of government officials public official distinction would
reach but concluding state commissioner responsible for supervising police department is reached by public official determination); see also Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (reasoning public official determination is motivated by
strong interest in public debate, strong interest in debate about individuals who
hold positions that influence resolution of public debates; stating it is clear public
official status applies to government employees that have, or appear to have, “substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs”);
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152–53 (1967) (plurality opinion) (reasoning public official determination aims to balance “the interests of the community
in free circulation of information and those of individuals in seeking recompense
for harm done by the circulation of defamatory falsehood”).
259. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (stating allpurpose public figures hold power or influence, noting involuntary public figures
are rare, but limited-purpose public figures “have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the
issues involved”).
260. See id. at 344–45 (reasoning public officials or public figures by way of
government job or public fame “must accept” unusually close public scrutiny, but
noting they have greater access to media to remedy reputational harm suffered by
such scrutiny).
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employees like high school coaches; instead, the Court cited precedent where individuals were public employees in positions of substantial influence in areas most commonly debated among the
citizenry.261 Similarly, while Rosenblatt also declined to create a
bright line definition of public official, it is clear high school
coaches do not fit the Rosenblatt criteria for public official classification because the criteria requires the position to be one the public
has strong interest in debating because the position affects public
issues and the individual is able to use that position to significantly
influence the resolution of public issues.262 As the National High
School Basketball Coaches Association points out, high school
coaches significantly influence and control how a sports team practices, but coaches do not control or influence players from other
schools, students within the school district he coached, the administration that hired them to coach, or even the parents of the players
they coach.263 Simply put, it is hard to imagine how the control
and influence coaches possess could be thought to influence the
resolution of almost any public issue the public has a strong interest
in debating.264 Even more persuasive is a look at footnote thirteen
in Rosenblatt where the Court stated:
But a conclusion that the New York Times malice standards apply could not be reached merely because a statement defamatory of some person in government employ
catches the public’s interest; that conclusion would virtually disregard society’s interest in protecting reputation.
The employee’s position must be one which would invite
261. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80 (stating New York Times rule
originates from Kansas Supreme Court case requiring Attorney General election
candidate to prove defendant acted with actual malice to prevail on defamation
claim); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76 (1964) (applying New York
Times rule eight months after its creation in panel of eight judges, stating “[the
Supreme Court] find[s] no difficulty” applying public official distinction).
262. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85 (concluding no bright-line definition is necessary for public official determination because it is informed by strong interest in
debate on public issues, including over individuals whose positions allow that individual to significantly influence outcome of those public issues); see also McGuire v.
Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 825 (Minn. 2019) (relying on Rosenblatt criteria to reason
general public interest in high school sports is too broad to satisfy criteria).
263. See Br. for Nat’l High Sch. Basketball Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant at 4, McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 2019) (No. A18-0167)
(highlighting influence, control coaches have in comparison to influence coaches
do not have).
264. See id. at 4–5 (stating public officials, such as road crews or postal workers, have ability to impact public in ways far more expansive than high school
coach’s ability, but those officials are not considered public officials because
amount of control over government affairs those positions yield is not substantial).
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public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by
the particular charges in controversy.265
Coaching positions in public school systems are simply not positions that invite public scrutiny and discussion of the individual occupying the position; however, defamatory statements like the
statements at issue in McGuire, are statements that may “catch the
public’s interest” and any conclusion that because of those statements the coach is a public official would “virtually disregard” the
valid interest in protecting one’s reputation.266 In fact, the limited
influence, if any, coaches hold over the resolution of public debate
is the reason why coaches like Mr. McGuire may have their coaching careers terminated based on complaints later determined to be
unfounded.267 The Minnesota State High School Coaches Association correctly summarized why Supreme Court jurisprudence does
not support finding that a high school is a public official when it
wrote pointedly, “high school coaches do not operate in the same
realm of public actors . . . considered in New York Times . . . (elected
city commissioner), and . . . Rosenblatt . . . (county parks supervisor)
— two of the foundational decisions addressing the ‘actual malice’
requirement for defamation claims filed by public officials.”268
Additionally, the Court’s public official and public figure analysis in Gertz is helpful in seeing why high school coaches under most
circumstances should not be considered public figures.269 First, the
Gertz Court quickly rejected the argument that the plaintiff was a
265. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 86 n.13 (explaining high school coaches do not
invite public scruitiny or discussion).
266. See id. (stating public official distinction cannot be based on public’s interest if interest arises only out of defamatory remarks); see also Br. for Nat’l High
Sch. Basketball Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra note 263, at 4–5
(stating government employees’ modest control over niche aspects of government
affairs should not elevate individual to public official status because doing so would
leave coaches like Mr. McGuire “powerless,” left with “no effective remedy”).
267. See id. at 5 (“It was precisely McGuire’s limited ability to affect policy or
wield government authority that permitted complaints, which were found unsubstantiated, to end McGuire’s coaching career.”); see also McGuire v. Bowlin, No. 82CV-15-6030, 2018 WL 6273533, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. December 3, 2018) (stating
Minnesota Board of Education found Mr. McGuire did not maltreat players, plus
school administration independent investigation concluded he did not inappropriately touch players, but he did fail to consider “emotional well-being of his players
. . . .”).
268. See Br. for MSHSCA, supra note 4, at 1 (arguing high school coaches
should not be faced with actual malice burden because duties, role of high school
coaches are outside realm of roles Supreme Court has described as worthy of public official distinction).
269. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351–52 (1974) (concluding
lawyer representing family was not public official or public figure).
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public official based on his appointment to the city’s housing committee.270 High school coaches are employed by the government
and may receive pay for time spent coaching, but it seems referring
to a high school coaching position as a “remunerative governmental position” would be a far stretch.271 Further, the Court rejected
the argument that the plaintiff’s positions in local civic and legal
groups along with his participation as a lawyer in civil litigation
which attracted widespread media attention was sufficient to render
him a limited purpose public figure.272 High school coaches may
be “well known in some circles” but it is far from general fame and
coaches do not assert themselves “into the vortex” of a public issue
when the public issue was created by the defamatory statement.273
Finally, the Supreme Court rejected an overly broad public or
general interest test to guide application of the New York Times
rule.274 Notably, the Court rejected such a broad test because it
failed to adequately serve individuals’ interest in protecting reputation and failed to serve the media’s interest in spreading information concerning public controversies.275 At best, statements
concerning high school coaches might be an area of general interest, but that is not enough and as the Court reasoned, if it was
270. See id. at 351 (rejecting defendant’s public official argument reasoning
plaintiff had “never held any remunerative governmental position”).
271. See id. (noting plaintiff never held any government position for pay).
272. See id. at 351–52 (discussing Plaintiff’s roles, concluding Plaintiff was private individual).
273. See id. (“Although [plaintiff] was consequently well known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame or notoriety in the community . . . . It is
preferable to reduce the public figure question to . . . the nature and extent of an
individual’s participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. In this context it is plain that petitioner was not a public figure . . . . He
plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public’s attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.”).
274. See id. at 346 (refusing to base actual malice application on whether publication concerned general or public interest); see also Andrew K. Craig, Comment,
The Rise in Press Criticism of the Athlete and the Future of Libel Litigation Involving Athletes and the Press, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 527, 532–33 (1994) (discussing Gertz
refusal to apply actual malice burden to private individuals when defamatory statements relate to “public concern”).
275. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974) (“The ‘public
or general interest’ test for determining the applicability of the New York Times
standard . . . inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake. On the one
hand, a private individual whose reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood
that does concern an issue of public or general interest has no recourse unless he
can meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times . . . . On the other hand, a
publisher . . . of a defamatory error which a court deems unrelated to an issue of
public or general interest may be held liable . . . even if it took every reasonable
precaution to ensure the accuracy of its assertions.”).
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enough to justify imposing the actual malice burden, the interest in
protecting reputation would be drastically underserved.276
2. McGuire v. Bowlin: The Preferred Private Versus Public Analysis in
the Context of Coaching High School Sports
The plaintiff in McGuire was a typical high school coach who
experienced unfortunate, but typical, criticisms regarding his
coaching decisions.277 Serious allegations targeted at Mr. McGuire
cost him his coaching position and stained his reputation in the
community; fortunately, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision
in McGuire fulfills the policy objective of the New York Times rule
rather than erroneously depriving high school coaches from remedying reputational harm suffered from such false, serious allegations.278 Looking at the motivating forces behind The New York
Times rule allowed the court to apply an analysis that affords high
school coaches who have had their careers and reputation tarnished by false, serious allegations to have the same fair chance at
receiving legal redress available to private individuals.279
In its public official analysis, the court’s three criteria adequately ensure high school coaches will not wrongly be grouped
into the public official distinction by focusing the criteria on the
nature of the position itself.280 The McGuire court’s conclusion that
the plaintiff’s position must relate to the core function of the government for the public official distinction to apply protects against
the possibility that almost any public employee will be deemed a
public official and is clearly in line with Supreme Court jurisprudence as well as the interests of high school coaches.281 Coaching
276. See id. at 346–48 (acknowledging strong legitimate interest in protecting
reputation was underserved under general interest test).
277. See Br. for MSHSCA, supra note 4, at 2 (noting “vitriolic attacks” against
coaches for playing time decisions).
278. See id. at 7 (stating classifying coaches as private individuals fulfills policy
objective of New York Times Rule); see also McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 824
(Minn. 2019) (balancing coach’s interest in protecting reputation with public’s
interest in official conduct).
279. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 824 (describing motivating factors behind
actual malice burden); see also O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1219
(Utah 2007) (concluding high school coaches do not occupy position Supreme
Court considered in establishing public official distinction).
280. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.13 (1966) (stating public versus
private status of plaintiff focuses on nature of plaintiff’s position); see also McGuire,
932 N.W.2d at 824 (stating three criteria used in public official inquiry in
Minnesota).
281. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 824–25 (“[T]o support the conclusion that
someone is a public official, his or her duties must relate to the core functions of
government, such as safety and public order.”); see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
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duties include making strategic game decisions and whatever interest the public has in the execution of those duties cannot support
classifying coaches as public officials because game decisions are
not related to the core function of the government.282
Similarly, a coaching position does not give the coach “substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government
affairs.”283 The plaintiff in New York Times was an elected commissioner responsible for oversight of the city police department, a position clearly providing the plaintiff with substantial responsibility
and control over government affairs.284 Finally, coaches are able to
influence the resolution of issues involving the team’s success, but
team success is not a public issue the public has a strong interest in
debating.285 The McGuire court’s analysis requires an appropriate
connection between a defamation plaintiff and the public position
they occupy to support a public official determination, effectively
protecting high school coaches from being wrongly stripped of
their ability to seek a legal remedy for defamation.286
In its public figure analysis, the court concluded there was no
public controversy to support classifying the plaintiff as a public official.287 This conclusion raises an important point, that criticizers
cannot spread false allegations that attract widespread attention
and then argue a public controversy existed because there was wide-

443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979) (concluding public official distinction cannot include
all public employees).
282. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 824–25 (describing duties of coach before
concluding public’s interest in coaching duties do not outweigh coach’s interest in
protecting reputation).
283. See id. at 826 (concluding coach employed by public school is “technically” involved in government affairs but not sufficiently to render coach public
official).
284. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964) (noting plaintiff’s
city commissioner position responsibilities).
285. See Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85 (stating motivating forces of actual malice
burden are “a strong interest in debate on public issues, and, second, a strong
interest in debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues”); see also McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 825–26 (concluding sports have strong emotional impacts on players, including their families,
but it does not support public official distinction).
286. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 827–28 (stating plaintiff’s position must
touch on matters concerning life, liberty, and property to support public official
status)); see also Br. for MSHSCA, supra note 4, at 8–9 (acknowledging coaches play
formative rule in student lives but urging court to require stronger connection
showing plaintiffs’ government affairs).
287. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 829 (stating no public controversy existed in
support of public figure distinction).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,

51

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7

472

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 421

spread public interest in the allegations.288 No public controversy
exists in high school sports, but allegations that a local coach was
inappropriately touching players is certainly a controversy that
would attract public interest, but absent the defamatory remarks,
there is no controversy.289
Further, high school sports may be thought of as a “controversy” because some aspects are capable of resolution, but a sport in
its entirety is not something capable of being “resolved.”290 The
Supreme Court in Rosenblatt stated the “profound national commitment” to keeping debate on public issues “robust” does not ignore
society’s “pervasive and strong interest” in protecting reputation.291
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis remains true to that statement because classifying high school coaches as public officials or
figures ignores society’s interest in protecting reputation and
wrongly suggests high school sports is a source of debate that the
Supreme Court felt there was a national commitment in keeping
robust.292
3. McGuire is Not Unique: Criticism of Coaches Becomes Defamatory
Far Too Often
It would be strange to hear of a coach that had never been
criticized by a player or parent, but far too often the criticisms go
way too far and make coaching much more difficult than it should
be.293 In fact, parent complaints have become such a problem for
coaches that in 2013 Minnesota enacted a law prohibiting parent
complaints from being the sole reason for not renewing a coaching
contract.294 High school sports come along with a lot of highs and
lows and complaints may be well-deserved, but coaches do not deserve to have their reputation stained and integrity questioned be288. See id. (“[A] party cannot stir up controversy by making defamatory statements and then point to the resulting controversy as a basis for assigning the defamed party public figure status.”).
289. See id. (reasoning no public controversy existed while concluding defamatory materials at issue cannot be basis of public controversy in support of public
figure distinction).
290. See id. (stating high school sports are not controversy because activity is
not capable of being resolved).
291. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85–86 (1966) (describing need to
balance interest in debate with interest in reputation).
292. See McGuire, 932 N.W.2d at 825 (noting importance of balancing interest
in debate with reputation).
293. See Br. for MSHSCA, supra note 4, at 2 (noting widespread problem of
coaches being slandered in response to coaching decisions).
294. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 122A.33 (West 2013) (stating parent complaints
may not be sole reason to refuse renewal of coaching contract).
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cause of false allegations that are made by disgruntled parents who
want a coach fired because their complaints regarding coaching decisions were not addressed.295
Allegations that a coach has abused players are serious and are
cause for concern, but defamation law adequately accounts for ensuring plaintiffs who had their reputations harmed by true statements will not be afforded a legal remedy.296 To ensure the
integrity and usefulness of high school sports, parents and athletes
should be able to expose genuine wrongful coaching conduct without facing liability, but sports integrity and usefulness also rests on
the ability of a coach to make coaching decisions for the best of the
team rather than for the best of a complaining parent.297 These
considerations are adequately accounted for without imposing the
heightened burden of actual malice because a defamation plaintiff
still must prove by a preponderance of the evidence not only that
the statements were false, but that the statements also harmed their
reputation.298 Similarly, some statements that are the basis of a defamation claim may enjoy a qualified privilege, leaving the defendant free from liability.299
IV. CONCLUSION: HIGH SCHOOL COACHES MUST BE DEEMED
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS
Defamation law dates far back in history because society has
traditionally recognized the valid interest in protecting reputation,
but liability on the basis of criticisms gone too far must not restrict
the Constitutional protection of free debate.300 The heightened
burden announced in New York Times protects both interests because it is a burden placed only on individuals who have a substan295. See O’Connor v. Burningham, 165 P.3d 1214, 1217 (Utah 2007) (stating
parents accused coach of misusing public funds after previous complaints made to
school administration did not result in coach’s termination); see also McGuire, 932
N.W.2d at 826 (acknowledging emotional aspects of high school sports).
296. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DEFAMATION § 558 (Am. L. Inst.
1977) (noting statements must be false to succeed in defamation claim).
297. See Br. for Nat’l High Sch. Basketball Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, supra note 263, at 5–6 (noting importance of taking misconduct allegations seriously but arguing false allegations may destroy careers which is deserving
of legal redress through defamation law).
298. See id. at 6–7 (noting elements of defamation while drawing attention to
requirement that coach must prove parent statements were false).
299. See McGuire v. Bowlin, 932 N.W.2d 819, 829 (Minn. 2019) (detailing parent defendants were granted summary judgment on basis of qualified privilege).
300. See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 151 (1967) (plurality opinion) (noting ancient roots of defamation law including Constitutional restrictions
placed on it).
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tial role in government affairs and have the ability to influence the
outcome of public issues.301 The principles addressed by the Supreme Court show that applying the heightened burden to high
school coaches would be incorrect.302 Cases that have addressed
the private or public status in the context of high school coach
plaintiffs show that courts who classify high school coaches as public officials misinterpret Supreme Court considerations and give too
little weight to the interests of coaches subjected to defamatory remarks.303 The analysis employed by the McGuire court is a correct
and fair application of the public versus private analysis, and it will
protect the beneficial nature of high school athletics by allowing
coaches to coach and discouraging parents from engaging in false
campaigns to influence how student athletes are coached.304
Mallory Shumaker*
301. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85–86 (1966) (describing purpose of
heightened burden).
302. For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s defamation jurisprudence
and the actual malice burden, see supra notes 28–66 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101, 1103
(Okla. 1978) (applying public official designation to high school coach). For further discussion of issues surrounding classifying high school coaches as public officials, see supra notes 258–276 and accompanying text.
304. For further discussion of why the McGuire analysis is the preferred analysis, see supra notes 277–292 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the
McGuire court’s full analysis, see supra notes 103–133 and accompanying text.
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